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I. INTRODUCTION

It is generally understood that there are two kinds of Erie problems.
One involves a conflict between state law and federal judge-made
(common) law. The other involves a conflict between state law and a
federal rule of civil procedure (or federal statute). In the latter, the analysis
calls for the use of the federal rule if it is valid and the rulemakers intended
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for it to apply to the matter at hand (if it is “on point”1). While the latter
branch of the analysis appears to be much simpler than the “relatively
unguided Erie” analysis the court must engage in when there is no written
federal rule, 2 the cases reveal a deeper complexity. The Supreme Court
interprets written federal rules with an eye toward Erie policies, and so
determining whether a federal rule is intended to apply is far from a
mechanical process. The cases, even on this more straightforward branch
of Erie, are hard to reconcile and the results are difficult to predict.
When the applicability and validity of a federal rule is at issue before
the Supreme Court, the Court will have touched the federal rule twice.
The second interaction with the rule—during litigation—is where the
issue described above comes into play. But the Court previously
encountered the rule in its role as a promulgater of the federal rules and a
transmitter of them to Congress. The Erie question as to the rule’s
applicability in the face of contrary state law is not decided at the front
end of this process but at the back end of it; it occurs at the time of
litigation over the rule and not at the time of the rule’s creation.
This article examines whether there is some good reason for this
structure. Back-loading the analysis of a rule’s displacement of state
law—its intended scope—as the current structure does, appears on its face
to be inefficient. It leaves potential litigants uncertain of the resolution of
the Erie issue until they become actual litigants and secure a ruling on the
issue from a court. Superficially, this Erie question should sensibly be
answered at the front end of the process, at the time of rule adoption. This
could be done by the Supreme Court issuing a statement accompanying
the adoption of the rule or by a statement from the actual drafters of the
rule—the Advisory Committee on the Rules of Civil Procedure (Advisory
Committee)—as to its applicability in diversity cases. Such an approach
to rulemaking is found in administrative law, where agencies sometimes
issue regulations with an explicitly claimed force of preemption of state
law or state in a preamble guidance suggesting preemption. On the other

* Jeffrey L. Rensberger is a Professor of Law at South Texas College of Law Houston. His primary
research areas are Civil Procedure, Conflict of Laws, and federal courts and jurisdiction.
1. See Esfeld v. Costa Crociere, S.P.A., 289 F.3d 1300, 1307 (11th Cir. 2002) (“If a federal
statute or rule of procedure is on point, the district court is to apply federal rather than state law.”)
(citing Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 471 (1965)); Trierweiler v. Croxton & Trench Holding Corp.,
90 F.3d 1523, 1539 (10th Cir. 1996) (“[W]here a federal rule of procedure is directly on point, that
rule applies.”) (citing Hanna, 380 U.S. at 471).
2. See Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22, 26 (1988) (“A district court’s decision
whether to apply a federal statute . . . involves a considerably less intricate analysis than that which
governs the ‘relatively unguided Erie choice.’”) (quoting Hanna, 380 U.S. at 471).

https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol52/iss2/6

2

Rensberger: Front-Loading the <i>Eire</i> Question

2018]

FRONT-LOADING THE ERIE QUESTION

325

hand, given that this approach has never been undertaken, there are
perhaps good reasons for declining to front-load the process in the context
of the federal rules.
This article examines the questions raised by the proposal to decide
the Erie question of state law displacement at the front end of the process.
After identifying the exact Erie issue under consideration in Part I, the
article proceeds to explain the proposal to front-load the analysis in Part
II, comparing it to common practices in administrative law and delving
into the history of the Advisory Committee and Supreme Court’s
comments accompanying the promulgation of the rules. Part III concludes
the analysis by considering the advantages and disadvantages of such an
approach. In the end, the case for such an approach is surprisingly strong
given that it has never been the usual practice of the creators of the rules.
II. LOCATING THE ERIE ISSUE
The Erie problem, in general, addresses how state and federal law
interact in cases based substantively on state law.3 It is commonly
accepted that there are two subsets of the Erie problem. 4 The first, the
subject of the Erie case 5 itself and of later cases such as Guaranty Trust
Co. v. York, 6 Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Electric Cooperative., Inc., 7 and
Gasperini v. Center for Humanities, Inc., 8 involves a conflict between
state law and federal judge-made law (i.e., federal procedural common

3. See Kermit Roosevelt III, Choice of Law in Federal Courts: From Erie and Klaxon to Cafa
and Shady Grove, 106 NW. U. L. REV. 1, 4 (2012) (“Erie analysis is now concerned with whether
federal or state law should be applied. . . .”).
4. See John Hart Ely, The Irrepressible Myth of Erie, 87 HARV. L. REV. 693, 697–98 (1974)
(“[T]he indiscriminate admixture of all questions respecting choices between federal and state law in
diversity cases, under the single rubric of ‘the Erie doctrine’ or ‘the Erie problem,’ has served to make
a major mystery out of what are really three distinct and rather ordinary problems. . . .”). Ely got to
three distinct problems by differentiating between conflicts between state law and a federal statute as
opposed to between state law and a federal rule of civil procedure. I would combine those two. See
also Adam N. Steinman, Our Class Action Federalism: Erie and the Rules Enabling Act After Shady
Grove, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1131, 1134 (2011) (describing the bifurcated approach in the cases).
5. Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
6. 326 U.S. 99, 101 (1945) (addressing the conflict between a state statute of limitations and
the federal common law on the time limit for suit in equity cases).
7. 356 U.S. 525, 533–34, 537 (1958) (addressing the conflict between state law that making
a certain factual issue a matter to be decided by the judge rather than the jury and the unwritten federal
practice that disputed facts are ordinarily decided by the jury).
8. 518 U.S. 415, 422–23 (1996) (addressing the conflict between state law setting a more
rigorous review of the size of jury verdicts than the federal judge-made shock the conscience
standard). For the sake of precision, it should be noted that the Justices in Gasperini disagreed on
whether Federal Rule 59 conflicted with state law. See infra note 40.
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law). The second involves a conflict between state law and a federal
standard that is found in a federal rule of civil procedure or federal statute.
This dichotomy was established in Hanna v. Plumer. 9 In Hanna,
state law on the method of service of process conflicted with Federal Rule
4. 10 The Court rejected an argument based on York that state law should
be used because the difference between state and federal law was
determinative of the outcome. 11 The Court explained that when a
“situation is covered by one of the federal rules, the question facing the
court is a far cry from the typical, relatively unguided Erie choice.” 12
When a federal rule is at issue, the federal rule controls, so long as it
“neither exceed[s] the congressional mandate embodied in the Rules
Enabling Act nor transgresse[s] constitutional bounds. . . .” 13 If the rule in
question is within the grant of the Enabling Act, it is therefore the
standard. 14 Thus, as a matter of the Supremacy Clause, 15 a federal rule
must “be applied if it represents a valid exercise of Congress’ rulemaking
authority. . . .” 16
Terminologically, some would not include the Hanna case and
similar problems (those involving a clash between a federal rule and state
law) within the scope of Erie, since the former’s resolution depends upon
the Rules Enabling Act 17 and the Supremacy Clause, while the latter (Erie

9. Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460 (1965).
10. Id. at 462.
11. Id. at 466.
12. Id. at 471.
13. Id. at 464.
14. Id.
15. On the role of the Supremacy clause in Hanna, see Margaret S. Thomas, Constraining the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Through the Federalism Canons of Statutory Interpretation, 16
N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 187, 205 (2013) (describing Hanna as “a pure expression of the
Supremacy Clause.”); Donald L. Doernberg, “The Tempest”: Shady Grove Orthopedic Associates,
P.A. v. Allstate Insurance Co.: The Rules Enabling Act Decision That Added to the Confusion-But
Should Not Have, 44 AKRON L. REV. 1147, 1155 (2011) (explaining that in cases involving the federal
rules, “[T]he Supremacy Clause . . . mandate[s] the triumph of federal law (even a Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure) over any contrary state rule.”); Jennifer S. Hendricks, In Defense of the SubstanceProcedure Dichotomy, 89 WASH. U. L. REV. 103, 114 n.50 (2011) (“[V]alid and applicable federal
law would preempt state law by virtue of the Supremacy Clause.”); Mary Kay Kane, The Golden
Wedding Year: Erie Railroad Company v. Tompkins and the Federal Rules, 63 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
671, 674 n.20 (1988) (explaining a valid “Federal Rule controls under the Supremacy Clause.”); see
also Jeffrey L. Rensberger, Erie and Preemption: Killing One Bird with Two Stones, 90 IND. L.J.
1591, 1610 (2015) (illustrating cases and “commentators agree that this strand of Hanna is a matter
of preemption. . . .”).
16. Burlington N. R. Co. v. Woods, 480 U.S. 1, 5 (1987).
17. 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (2012).
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proper) is an application of the Rules of Decision Act. 18 I prefer to keep
the two doctrines under a single umbrella, “Erie,” for both convenience
and, I believe, precision. 19 A hard dichotomy—splitting the hemispheres
of the Erie brain—hides the underlying similarity of the two branches.
Both are instances of preemption. 20 This is easiest to see in the Hanna
wing of the Erie problem. When a federal rule of civil procedure (or a
federal statute) conflicts with state law, valid federal law preempts
conflicting state law. But federal common law, which is the original Erie
part of the doctrine, also has preemptive power. This is true of substantive
federal common law and is equally true of federal procedural common
law. 21
This article focuses on the Hanna—federal rule of civil procedure—
side of Erie. Under the standard Hanna analysis, a written federal rule
trumps conflicting state law so long as the federal rule is valid, i.e., within
the grant of authority under the Rules Enabling Act, and not
unconstitutional for some other reason. But not every federal rule
proffered by a party as controlling is in fact relevant. Sometimes, “the
federal rule was not as broad as the losing party argued.” 22 The first
question in these cases is “whether the scope of the federal rule in fact is
sufficiently broad to control the issue before the Court.” 23 If the rule is of
such a breadth, it controls over conflicting state law, so long as it is within
the scope of the Enabling Act.
18. The Rules of Decision Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (2012) (“[The] laws of the several states,
except where the Constitution or treaties of the United States or Acts of Congress otherwise require
or provide, shall be regarded as rules of decision in civil actions in the courts of the United States, in
cases where they apply.”) On the distinction between the problems raised under the Rules of Decision
Act and those arising under the Rules Enabling Act, see Ely, supra note 4 & accompanying text.
19. Suzanna Sherry agrees that cases involving a federal rule should be analyzed under the
Erie umbrella:
[F]raming the question as one of the validity of the Federal Rule under the REA—as
Sibbach did—hides the real Erie issue: Application of a Federal Rule might impair
substantive rights in one state but not in another, or in one type of case but not another.
And it is the Erie doctrine, not the REA, that controls the decision of whether a particular
state rule prevails over a conflicting federal one.
Suzanna Sherry, A Pox on Both Your Houses: Why the Court Can’t Fix the Erie Doctrine, 10 J.L.
ECON. & POLICY 173, 178 (2013); see also Donald L. Doernberg, supra note 15, at 1209 (“[T]he
terms ‘Erie problem’ and ‘Erie doctrine’ customarily refer to the entire vertical choice-of-law
enterprise, and it has gotten too late in the day to expect successful recharacterization as “the vertical
choice-of-law problem.”).
20. I have argued elsewhere for a “recoupling of the Hanna and non-Hanna branches of Erie”
because on “either side of the analysis, one must consult some ordering principles to aid in the
interpretation of the scope of federal law.” See Rensberger, supra note 15, at 1622.
21. See id. at 1611.
22. Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 470 (1965).
23. Walker v. Armco Steel Corp., 446 U.S. 740, 749–50 (1980).
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The scope question is not a simple matter of text. Some rules that
seemed facially applicable were determined by the Supreme Court not to
be. Federal Rule 3, for example, provides simply that a “civil action is
commenced by filing a complaint with the court.” 24 Is the action timely if
it was filed before the statute of limitations runs but service does not occur
until after? What if state law expressly provides that both filing and
service must occur before the statute runs?
Before Hanna (decided in 1965) had established the preemption
analysis for conflicts between state law and federal rules, the Court ruled
in Ragan v. Merchants Transfer & Warehouse Co. 25 that state law, not
Rule 3, applied in this situation. This may be a fine result as a matter of
Erie policies. The difference between state and federal law would be
highly determinative of the outcome of the case (this was in fact the basis
for the Court’s decision). 26
And York, using this same “outcome determinative” test, had already
determined that state statutes of limitations had to be adhered to in
diversity. 27 Since the subject of Ragan was a rule that implemented a
statute of limitations, it would be sensible for the tail to go with the dog
that was wagging it—the rule concerning whether service or mere filing
suffices to satisfy the statute of limitations should be attached to the rule
that is the statute of limitations. But whatever the wisdom of such an
outcome, it is hard to square with Hanna, which says that a valid federal
rule applies in the face of conflicting state law.
The Court later resolved this tension between Ragan and Hanna by
asserting that Ragan had not held that Rule 3 was invalid or that Erie
prevented its application. Instead, in Walker v. Armco Steel Corp. 28 the
Court explained that Rule 3 was not as broad as was argued and therefore
there was “no federal rule which covered the point in dispute.” 29 Walker
dealt with exactly the same issue as Ragan—Rule 3 versus a state law that
required service before the expiration of the statute of limitations—and
reached the same result of using state law despite Hanna. Per the Court,

24. FED. R. CIV. P. 3.
25. 337 U.S. 530 (1949).
26. Id. at 532:
Erie . . . was premised on the theory that in diversity cases the rights enjoyed under local
law should not vary because enforcement of those rights was sought in the federal court
rather than in the state court. If recovery could not be had in the state court, it should be
denied in the federal court.
27. Guar. Tr. Co. of N.Y. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 109–10 (1945).
28. Walker, 446 U.S. 740.
29. Id. at 750.
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there was no indication that Rule 3 “was intended to toll a state statute of
limitations, much less . . . displace state tolling rules.” 30
The basis for saying that Rule 3 was not intended to apply to this
issue is not apparent. It is not the result of textual analysis. The Court
stated that “Rule 3 governs the date from which various timing
requirements of the Federal Rules begin to run, but does not affect state
statutes of limitations.” 31 But this doesn’t fly; there were no other timing
requirements in the federal rules tied to the commencement of the action
at the time Rule 3 was promulgated. 32 Timing requirements in the rules
are tied to the date of service, not commencement. 33 Moreover, lower
courts had previously ruled that Rule 3 did serve to define what must be
done to beat the statute of limitations in cases arising under federal law34
and after Walker they reached the same conclusion 35 as did the Supreme
Court. 36 Indeed, Walker itself noted the potential applicability of Rule 3
to toll a federal cause of action. 37 Walker relies upon a very granular
reading of the rulemakers’ intent. 38 Rule 3, the Court explained was not
30. Id. at 750–51.
31. Id. at 751.
32. See Jeffrey L. Rensberger, Hanna’s Unruly Family: An Opinion for Shady Grove
Orthopedic Associates v. Allstate Insurance, 44 CREIGHTON L. REV. 89, 92 (2010). Rule 38(b) in the
original rules did establish a time-frame for a jury trial demand— “any time after the commencement
of the action and not later than 10 days after the service of the last pleading directed to such issue.”
See Rules of Civil Procedure for the District Courts of the United States, 308 U.S. 663, 714 (1939).
But that was not a timing requirement. It sets the beginning of a period not a deadline for completion.
It would seem to be a mere truism that one could not demand a jury trial before filing a complaint in
the action.
33. See Rensberger, supra note 32.
34. See Bomar v. Keyes, 162 F.2d 136, 140 (2d Cir. 1947) (holding that “it is the filing of the
complaint which tolls the statute” by virtue of Rule 3).
35. See Sentry Corp. v. Harris, 802 F.2d 229, 231–32 (7th Cir. 1986); See also Wright & Miller
et al., 4 FED. PRAC. & PROC. CIV. § 1056 (4th ed.) (explaining “the filing of the complaint commences
a federal question case for statute of limitations purposes” subject to the requirement of timely service
in Rule 4.).
36. See Henderson v. United States, 517 U.S. 654, 657 n.2 (1996). The Court noted, in dicta,
that in “a suit on a right created by federal law, filing a complaint suffices to satisfy the statute of
limitations.” Id. When a case arises under federal law and the courts borrow an analogous statute of
limitations from another federal statute, the Court has held that Rule 3 determines tolling. See West
v. Conrail, 481 U.S. 35, 39 (1987) (“[W]hen the underlying cause of action is based on federal law
and the absence of an express federal statute of limitations makes it necessary to borrow a limitations
period from another statute, the action is not barred if it has been ‘commenced’ in compliance with
Rule 3 within the borrowed period.”).
37. See Walker v. Armco Steel Corp., 446 U.S. 740, 751 n.11 (“We do not here address the
role of Rule 3 as a tolling provision for a statute of limitations . . . if the cause of action is based on
federal law.”).
38. See Rensberger, supra note 32, at 91–92:
Walker in fact was oddly careful in its language. It did not say that Rule 3 was not intended
to give a tolling rule for statutes of limitations. It instead said that Rule 3 was not “intended
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“intended to toll a state statute of limitations” 39 but might well be (and
indeed was later held to have) intended to provide the tolling rule for
federal causes of action. This intent was nowhere to be found in the rule’s
text or the notes of the Advisory Committee.
In contrast to Ragan’s and Walker’s curiously narrow reading of
Rule 3, 40 in other cases the Court has expanded a rule that was not clearly
textually applicable and used it to trump state law under Hanna. In
Burlington Northern Railroad Co. v. Woods, 41 the Court held inapplicable
in diversity cases a state statute that required an automatic ten percent
penalty against an unsuccessful appeal of a money judgment. State law
did not apply, the Court held, because it conflicted with Federal Rule of
Appellate Procedure 38, which provides for a discretionary award of
damages and costs for frivolous appeals. 42 But this conflict was not
necessary. Federal Rule 38 could have been read as supplementing, not
contradicting, state law by giving an extra and discretionary penalty for
frivolous appeals on top of the automatic ten percent tax of all losing
appeals under state law. And Rule 38 is not in its text prohibitory. It
nowhere says that its scheme of discretionary damages for frivolous
appeals is to exclude all other awards. 43

to toll a state statute of limitations.” Now, that is slicing the bread rather finely. Rule 3
was “intended” to provide a tolling rule for statutes of limitations for causes of action
based on federal law, but it was not intended to do so for causes of action based on state
law. Where one finds this intention for the differential application of Rule 3 is nowhere
stated.
39. Walker, 446 U.S. at 750 (emphasis added).
40. Hanna’s treatment of Ragan “implied that courts could construe a Federal Rule against the
plain import of its text to conclude that the scope of the Federal Rule was not broad enough to control
the point in issue.” Bernadette Bollas Genetin, Reassessing the Avoidance Canon in Erie Cases, 44
AKRON L. REV. 1067, 1097 (2011). Other cases giving an unnecessarily narrow scope to a federal
rule and thereby avoiding the Hanna preemption analysis include Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities,
Inc., 518 U.S. 415 (1996). In Gasperini, the Court allowed state law to govern the standard of review
to be used in reviewing the size of a jury verdict. The Court casually dismissed the argument—which
was more than plausible as a textual matter—that Federal Rule 59 governed. Id. at 418–19. Rule 59
provides for a new trial on grounds that “heretofore” had been used. See FED. R. CIV. P. 59 (a)(1)(A).
Since the state law was a recent innovation, it was not a ground “heretofore” used. See Gasperini, 518
U.S. at 467–68 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
41. 480 U.S. 1 (1987).
42. Id.
43. See Richard D. Freer & Thomas C. Arthur, The Irrepressible Influence of Byrd, 44
CREIGHTON L. REV. 61, 72 (2010) (“Why those two rules could not co-exist is not explained, probably
because the Court had not by that time conceded that it was reading rules with a sensitivity to [Erie
policies].”).
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Many commentators agree that the Supreme Court has been
inconsistent in its interpretative approach to federal rules. 44 It is also
generally understood that this interpretive inconsistency results from the
Court’s desire to avoid having a federal rule—all but automatically
triumphant over state law under Hanna—impinge upon state interests or
create unhealthy forum-shopping opportunities. 45 The Court at one time
denied using an interpretive filter on the rules. In Walker v. Armco Steel
Corp., the Court stated that the federal rules are not “to be narrowly
construed in order to avoid a ‘direct collision’ with state law” and that
they should “be given their plain meaning.” 46 But it finally owned up to
the practice in Gasperini v. Center for Humanities, Inc., 47 where it
acknowledged that “Federal courts have interpreted the Federal Rules . . .
with sensitivity to important state interests and regulatory policies.”48
The policy-based interpretive approach to reading the federal rules
was spread across the several opinions produced by the fractured ruling in
Shady Grove Orthopedic Associates, P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co. 49 Justice
Scalia, for the Court, agreed federal rules should be read to avoid
“substantial variations [in outcomes] between state and federal litigation,”
as long as the federal rule had some textual ambiguity. 50 Justice Stevens
articulated two bases for giving a federal rule a narrowing construction.
First, to respect “Congress’ command that [the] rules not alter substantive
rights,” they must be read with “sensitivity to important state interests and
44. See, e.g., Benjamin Ernst, Fighting Slapps in Federal Court: Erie, the Rules Enabling Act,
and the Application of State Anti-SLAPP Laws in Federal Diversity Actions, 56 B.C. L. REV. 1181,
1192–93 (2015); Thomas, supra note 15, at 207 (“Thus, even after Hanna, the Court continued to
account for federalism concerns by examining the state policy purpose underlying the law being
displaced, and by using creative interpretive approaches to avoid applying particular Rules.”);
Stephen R. Brown, For Lack of A Better Rule: Using the Concept of Transsubstantivity to Solve the
Erie Problem in Shady Grove, 80 U. CIN. L. REV. 1, 14 (2011) (“To avoid the more rigid Enabling
Act analysis, courts have at times interpreted the Federal Rule to avoid a conflict with state law.”).
45. See Freer & Arthur, supra note 43, at 72 (“[E]ven though unwilling to own up to it, the
Court pretty clearly applied a substantive canon of construction: if possible, read Federal Rules
narrowly to avoid trenching on state substantive interests. . . .”); Rensberger, supra note 32, at 96–
100; Bollas Genetin, supra note 40, at 1068:
[T]he Court often constru[ed] Federal Rules narrowly to avoid a conflict with state law,
(and sometimes construing against any meaning that the text and history of the Federal
Rule at issue would appear to bear to avoid the conflict), [and] sometimes constru[ed]
Federal Rules broadly and seeming to reach out to find conflict where conflict was not
necessary.
46. 446 U.S. 740, 750 n.9 (1980).
47. 518 U.S. 415 (1996).
48. Id. at 428 n.7.
49. 559 U.S. 393 (2010). Parts of the opinion were a plurality only. See id. at 395.
50. See id. at 405 n.7 (quoting Semtek Int’l Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 531 U.S. 497, 504
(2001)).
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regulatory policies.” 51 Second, they should be interpreted “with
consideration of ‘the degree to which the Rule makes the character and
result of the federal litigation stray from the course it would follow in state
courts.’” 52 Likewise Justice Ginsberg in dissent agreed that the rules
should be interpreted to protect important state interests and regulatory
policies. 53
Thus, Hanna’s attempt to create a clear safe harbor for the
applicability of the federal rules has been frustrated by the Court’s
unwillingness to allow a federal rule to intrude unduly on state policies
that are sufficiently substantive or to create opportunities for destabilizing
forum-shopping. Cases involving a conflict between state law and a
federal rule remain difficult Erie questions, with the Erie policies of
protecting state regulatory autonomy and avoiding differing outcomes in
state and federal court remaining relevant. The fundamental question is
whether the federal rule displaces state law, and that question is addressed
in the cases not as a simple factual question but as a normative one. The
question is not whether the federal rule in fact displaces state law, it is
whether the federal rule should displace state law. Stated simply, the
Court employs a preemption model that takes the Erie policies into
account when deciding the preemption question. 54
The end result on the Hanna side of the Erie family is a form of
enlightened Hanna, or perhaps one might say Hanna with a human face.
True, a federal rule will trump state law, but one reaches that conclusion
only after answering two antecedent questions that soften the absolutism
of Hanna. First, one asks if the federal rule was intended to apply to the
matter at hand. This question is answered by looking at the policies that
undergird the Erie doctrine: respect for state substantive polices and the
instability and unfairness created by forum-shopping. 55 Second, there is
always at least a potential issue of validity: only a valid federal rule will
trump state law. In order to apply, the rule must be within the scope of the
51. Id. at 418–19 (Stevens, J., concurring) (quoting Gasperini, 518 U.S. at 427 n.7)).
52. Id. at 419 (quoting Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 473 (1965)).
53. See id. at 442 (quoting Gasperini, 518 U.S. at 427, n.7, 438).
54. See generally Rensberger, supra note 15, at 1620-34.
55. One could add to this list of policies a countervailing one that pushes toward using federal
law: the presence of federal interests in using federal law. See Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Co-op.,
Inc., 356 U.S. 525, 537 (1958) (“[A]ffirmative countervailing considerations at work here. The federal
system is an independent system for administering justice to litigants who properly invoke its
jurisdiction.”). The Erie policies favoring use of state law are “tempered by the third core interest—
the interest of the federal judicial system as an ‘independent system for administering justice to
litigants who properly invoke its jurisdiction.’” Freer & Arthur, supra note 43, at 66 (quoting Byrd,
356 U.S. at 537).
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Enabling Act. This last question, however, is largely theoretical since the
Supreme Court has set an extremely low hurdle for a rule’s validity. It
must merely “really regulate[] procedure,—the judicial process for
enforcing rights and duties recognized by substantive law and for justly
administering remedy and redress for disregard or infraction of them.” 56
No federal rule has failed to meet this standard.
All the action in the Hanna line of cases is thus found on the first
question of “whether the scope of the federal rule in fact is sufficiently
broad to control the issue before the Court.” 57 It is on this question that
this article focuses. Could the question of the proper scope of a federal
rule in diversity cases be addressed at the time of its creation? The article,
it should be noted, does not propose that the rulemakers should explicitly
address the second Hanna question of the validity of the rule under the
Rules Enabling Act. As to that latter question, the rulemakers implicitly
assert validity else they would not create and transmit the proposed rule.
III. THE ALTERNATIVE APPROACH: FRONT-LOADING THE ERIE
QUESTION
The foregoing brings my proposal into focus. The Supreme Court
interacts with the federal rules in several ways. First, in litigation, it may
be presented with a question of how to interpret an admittedly applicable
federal rule. Cases such as Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 58 which addressed the proper
understanding of Federal Rule 8 on the sufficiency of pleadings, and WalMart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 59 which addressed the proper interpretation of
Rule 23 on class actions, are two relatively recent examples. Second, in a
diversity case, the question is not what the federal rule means, but whether
it is applicable at all. Does it displace state law? Cases such as Shady
Grove Orthopedic Associates, P.A. v. Allstate Insurance Co. 60 (which
dealt with the applicability in a diversity case of Rule 23) is a recent
example of this type of case. The third (and underappreciated) interaction
of the Supreme Court with a federal rule is during the time the Court
adopts the rule and transmits it to Congress. Under standard practice, the
Court transmits proposed rules without comment. Could the Court
profitably address the question of the rule’s applicability in diversity as
against state law earlier, at the time of transmittal to Congress? What
56.
(1941)).
57.
58.
59.
60.
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559 U.S. 393 (2010).

11

Akron Law Review, Vol. 52 [2019], Iss. 2, Art. 6

334

AKRON LAW REVIEW

[52:323

would be the advantages and disadvantages of such an approach? If not
the Court, should the rules Advisory Committee provide in their
comments a note on the Erie issue? These matters are taken up below.
A.

A Primer on the Rules-Creation Process

Before analyzing what the Supreme Court could do, it is helpful to
remind ourselves what it actually does. What is the structure of the federal
rule creation process?
The federal rules have their genesis in the Rules Enabling Act. 61 It
grants to the Supreme Court the power to “prescribe general rules of
practice and procedure and rules of evidence for cases in the United States
district courts.” 62 The Court, of course, does not itself write the rules.
Congress has directed the Judicial Conference, which consists of “the
chief judge of each judicial circuit, the chief judge of the Court of
International Trade, and a district judge from each judicial circuit,” to
“carry on a continuous study of the operation and effect of the general
rules of practice and procedure” and to recommend “[s]uch changes in
and additions to those rules as [it] may deem desirable . . . to the Supreme
Court for its consideration and adoption, modification or rejection.” 63
Beneath the Judicial Conference is the Standing Committee on Rules of
Practice and Procedure.64 The Chief Justice appoints members (federal
judges, state judges, academics, practitioners, and representatives of the
Justice Department) to the Standing Committee. 65 Finally, beneath the
Standing Committee are subject-matter specific Advisory Committees. 66

61. Summaries of the rulemaking process may be found in Lumen N. Mulligan & Glen
Staszewski, The Supreme Court’s Regulation of Civil Procedure: Lessons from Administrative Law,
59 UCLA L. REV. 1188, 1200–02 (2012); Elizabeth G. Porter, Pragmatism Rules, 101 CORNELL L.
REV. 123, 144–45 (2015); Peter G. McCabe, Renewal of the Federal Rulemaking Process, 44 AM. U.
L. REV. 1655, 1664–74 (1995).
62. 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (2012).
63. 28 U.S.C. § 331 (2012).
64. 28 U.S.C. § 2073(b) (2012) (“The Judicial Conference shall authorize the appointment of
a standing committee on rules of practice, procedure. . . .”).
65. For a description of the Standing Committee, see http://www.uscourts.gov/rulespolicies/about-rulemaking-process/committee-membership-selection
[https://perma.cc/AK4WDLP5]. Its current roster may be found at http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/
2017_committee_roster.pdf [https://perma.cc/5JKJ-RDD6]. Advisory Committees are authorized by
28 U.S.C. § 2073(a)(2) (2012) (“The Judicial Conference may authorize the appointment of
committees to assist the Conference by recommending rules to be prescribed under sections 2072 and
2075 of this title. Each such committee shall consist of members of the bench and the professional
bar, and trial and appellate judges.”).
66. See Mulligan & Staszewski, supra note 61, at 1200–01 (2012).
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Each Advisory Committee is to “recommend[] rules to be
prescribed.” 67 The Advisory Committees’ meetings are open to the public,
as are their minutes. 68 Proposals for changes to rules can start with a
member of the public (a lawyer, judge, or academic submitting a proposal
to the Advisory Committees 69) or they can originate with the Committee
as a part of the continuous study of the rules that Congress has demanded
of the Judicial Conference. 70 The Committee’s Reporter, a law professor
with expertise in the field, prepares drafts for the Advisory Committee. 71
The Advisory Committee then decides whether to forward a proposed rule
to the Standing Committee. 72 The Advisory Committee is statutorily
obliged to accompany proposed rule changes with a commentary
explaining the proposal. 73 If the proposed rule goes to the Standing
Committee, that body then decides whether to take the next step, which is
to release the proposal to the public for comment. 74 After possible
revisions by the Advisory Committee in response to comments, 75 the rule
is forwarded by the Standing Committee to the Judicial Conference, 76
which in turn submits it to the Supreme Court. 77 Once there, the Court has

67. 28 U.S.C. § 2073(a)(2) (2012).
68. 28 U.S.C. § 2073(c) (2012).
69. See McCabe, supra note 61, at 1672.
70. See 28 U.S.C. § 331 (2012).
71. See
United
States
Courts,
Committee
Membership
Selection,
http://www.uscourts.gov/rules-policies/about-rulemaking-process/committee-membership-selection
[https://perma.cc/HM8X-UA2E] (“The reporters research the relevant law and draft memoranda
analyzing suggested rule changes, develop proposed drafts of rules for committee consideration,
review and summarize public comments on proposed amendments, and generate the committee notes
and other materials documenting the rules committees’ work.”).
72. See Procedures for Committees on Rules of Practice and Procedure, 320 F.R.D. 845, 846
(2015).
73. See 28 U.S.C. § 2073(d) (2012) (“[T]he body making that recommendation shall provide
a proposed rule, an explanatory note on the rule, and a written report explaining the body’s action,
including any minority or other separate views.”).
74. See 320 F.R.D. at 846; See also 28 U.S.C. § 2073(b) (2012) (stating that the “standing
committee shall review each recommendation of any other committees so appointed and recommend
to the Judicial Conference rules of practice, procedure, and evidence and such changes in rules
proposed. . . .”).
75. See 320 F.R.D. at 847 (“The advisory committee reviews the proposed change in light of
any comments and testimony.”).
76. See id. at 848 (explaining that the Standing Committee is charged with “deciding whether
to accept or modify the proposals and transmit them with its own recommendation to the Judicial
Conference, recommit them to the advisory committee for further study and consideration, or reject
them.”).
77. See 28 U.S.C. § 331 (2012) (“[C]hanges in and additions to those rules as the Conference
may deem desirable . . . shall be recommended by the Conference from time to time to the Supreme
Court. . . .”).
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the prerogative of transmitting the rule to Congress or declining to do so. 78
In recent years, the Court has acted more or less as a conduit, passing
along proposed rules from the foregoing rulemaking apparatus without
objection or comment. 79 Unless Congress acts to change the rule, it takes
effect. 80
In this arrangement, similar to many bureaucracies, authority and
actual labor are inversely related. Ultimate authority resides at the top, in
the Supreme Court, and below it the Judicial Conference. Nothing goes to
Congress without the approval of these bodies. But all the heavy lifting—
the research and actual drafting—is performed at the lowest levels, by the
Advisory Committee and especially the Reporter. Official action toward
a rule in addition to developing its text, such as a statement of its intended
scope, would logically best reside at one of these poles, either with the
body with the most authority (the Supreme Court) or the one that does
most of the actual labor (the Advisory Committee).
B.

The Administrative Law Analogy

The institutional arrangements set out above closely mirror that of an
administrative agency charged by Congress with developing rules to
govern a given subject matter. In the Rules Enabling Act, Congress directs
that the Supreme Court and the Judicial Conference study and create rules
to govern litigation in the federal courts. The rule-creating body consists
of experts in the field, lawyers, judges, and academics. After the rules are
created, they have the force of law. In both rulemaking under the Enabling
Act and administrative rule making, experts with “direct experience and
specialized knowledge” act to “set agendas and incorporate policy
preferences.” 81 The Rules Enabling Act mimics the Administrative
Procedure Act in requiring “notice, an opportunity for public comment,
and reasoned rulemaking.” 82 In common with agencies, the Court as a

78. See McCabe, supra note 61, at 1673; see also 28 U.S.C. § 2074 (2012) (“The Supreme
Court shall transmit to the Congress not later than May 1 of the year in which a rule prescribed under
section 2072 is to become effective a copy of the proposed rule. Such rule shall take effect no earlier
than December 1 of the year in which such rule is so transmitted unless otherwise provided by law.”).
79. See David Marcus, Institutions and an Interpretive Methodology for the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, 2011 UTAH L. REV. 927, 942 (2011).
80. See McCabe, supra note 61, at 1673.
81. Scott Dodson, Should the Rules Committees Have an Amicus Role?, 104 VA. L. REV. 1, 11
(2018).
82. Marcus, supra note 79, at 935.
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rulemaker “is an institution that sets policy . . . with a discretionary docket
and the choice of setting policy by way of adjudication or rulemaking.” 83
Agencies, not infrequently, issue regulations or statements about the
preemptive effect of their regulations. The Federal Communications
Commission, for example, issued regulations upholding a “policy [that]
prohibits state and local technical regulations” of cable television signals
“that are inconsistent with those adopted by the Commission.” 84 Likewise,
the Food and Drug Administration stated that “under existing preemption
principles, FDA approval of labeling under the act . . . preempts
conflicting or contrary State law” as to tort liability for mislabeling
prescription drugs. 85 Preemption assertions by agencies may occur in a
variety of legislative contexts. Congress may have expressly authorized
the agency to determine preemption. 86 Such pronouncements are
determinative 87 under Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inc. 88 Chevron requires courts to defer to agency interpretations
that are a “permissible construction of the statute,” 89 a low standard,
satisfied so long as the interpretation is reasonable 90 or simply not
irrational. 91 Or Congress may have granted the agency rulemaking power
and a statutory provision contains an express preemption clause. 92 The
cases are divided on whether agencies have authority to issue preemption
regulations as a part of their power to issue substantive regulations or
whether it is necessary that Congress expressly delegate this power to the
agency. 93 Or the agency could operate under a statute that has no
preemption provision, but bases a power to preempt on its delegated
power to regulate and a perceived incompatibility of its regulations with
83. Mulligan & Staszewski, supra note 61, at 1202.
84. See Technical and Operational Requirements of Part 76 Cable Television, 50 FR 52462–
02 (1985). The preemption was upheld in City of New York v. F.C.C., 486 U.S. 57, 66 (1988) (“[T]he
Commission acted within the statutory authority conferred by Congress when it pre-empted state and
local technical standards.”).
85. See Requirements on Content and Format of Labeling for Human Prescription Drug and
Biological Products, 71 FR 3922–01 (2006). The purported preemption was rejected in Wyeth v.
Levine, 555 U.S. 555 (2009).
86. See William Funk, Judicial Deference and Regulatory Preemption by Federal Agencies,
84 TUL. L. REV. 1233, 1242 (2010).
87. See id.
88. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
89. Id. at 843.
90. Christopher J. Walker, Attacking Auer and Chevron Deference: A Literature Review, 16
GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 103, 110 (2018).
91. See Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. & Research v. U.S., 562 U.S. 44, 60 (2011) (“[T]he
Department certainly did not act irrationally.”).
92. See Funk, supra note 86, at 1242–43.
93. See Funk, supra note 86, at 1243–47.
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state law. 94 As an alternative to determining the preemption issue by
regulation, the agency may simply offer an opinion on the matter in a
preamble or as an amicus in litigation. 95 Whether or not the underlying
legislation has a preemption provision, such statements serve as “an
opinion as to how the effect of state law would conflict or stand as an
obstacle to the full accomplishment of the agency’s regulation.” 96
My proposal to front-load the Erie issue fits into this paradigm. Like
an agency, the Advisory Committee or the Judicial Conference or the
Supreme Court could opine in writing about how the rule interacts with
state law—whether it preempts state law in federal courts. Which of these
entities, if any, should perform this function will be examined later. 97 But
any one of them could do so. And if the agency analogy holds, its
statements would be entitled to some deference in later litigation.
The Rules Enabling Act has no preemption clause. It does have a
supersession clause: “All laws in conflict with such rules shall be of no
further force or effect after such rules have taken effect.” 98 But it has been
convincingly demonstrated that this clause is directed at prior federal law
that conflicts with a federal rule. 99 And there is no power granted to the
Supreme Court to issue preemption statements. In such cases in
administrative law, when “there is neither a statutory preemption
provision nor a delegation to the agency to make a preemption
determination” the agency lacks authority to make a “preemption
determination with the force of law.” 100 That is, it may not issue a
regulation governing preemption. But it may offer its opinion in a
preamble or other non-regulatory statement, and the courts will value the
“agency’s experience” and its “particularly valuable perspective on the
question of whether those state laws should be preempted by the agency’s
94. See Funk, supra note 86, at 1247.
95. See Funk, supra note 86, at 1249.
96. See Funk, supra note 86, at 1250.
97. See infra notes 237–55 and accompanying text.
98. 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (b) (2012).
99. See Roosevelt III, supra note 3, at 38 (“[T]his sentence is most naturally read to be not
about the interaction of the Rules with state law but instead about their interaction with federal laws.
It affirms . . . that valid Rules can displace prior inconsistent federal statutes.”); Paul D. Carrington,
“Substance” and “Procedure” in the Rules Enabling Act, 1989 DUKE L.J. 281, 322 (1989) (“[O]nly
a federal law could be superseded, for ‘such rules’ are limited in their application to federal courts,
and ‘all laws’ therefore cannot include state laws written primarily to be enforced in state courts.”);
see also Leslie M. Kelleher, Taking “Substantive Rights” (in the Rules Enabling Act) More Seriously,
74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 47, 93 (1998) (“Congress’ animating concern with the Rules Enabling Act
in 1934 was the allocation of authority between Congress and the Supreme Court.”); Stephen B.
Burbank, The Rules Enabling Act of 1934, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1015, 1109–11 (1982).
100. See Funk, supra note 86, at 1248.
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regulations.” 101 Thus, such an agency pronouncement is entitled to some
deference. As the Court explained in Wyeth v. Levine, while strict Chevron
deference is not applicable, the softer deference under Skidmore v. Swift
& Co. 102 is:
While agencies have no special authority to pronounce on pre-emption
absent delegation by Congress, they do have a unique understanding of
the statutes they administer and an attendant ability to make informed
determinations about how state requirements may pose an “obstacle to
the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of
Congress.” The weight we accord the agency’s explanation of state
law’s impact on the federal scheme depends on its thoroughness,
consistency, and persuasiveness. 103

Under Skidmore, agency actions “while not controlling upon the courts by
reason of their authority, do constitute a body of experience and informed
judgment to which courts and litigants may properly resort for
guidance.” 104 Thus a court may determine that preemption exists based on
“the agency’s current views of the regulation’s pre-emptive effect.” 105 In
Geier v. American Honda Motor Co., Inc., 106 the Court found preemption
and gave as a supporting reason the Department of Transportation’s view
“that a tort suit such as this one would ‘stan[d] as an obstacle to the
accomplishment and execution’ of those objectives.” 107 Because of the
complexity of the issue, the “agency is likely to have a thorough
understanding of its own regulation and its objectives and is ‘uniquely
qualified’ to comprehend the likely impact of state requirements.” 108
Thus, if the promulgation of the rules were treated in a manner
similar to the promulgation of agency regulations, the rulemakers could
not issue Chevron-style ukases, but they could issue a statement offering
a view on how state and federal law interact. Such a statement would be
given some weight in later litigation.

101. See Funk, supra note 86, at 1248.
102. 323 U.S. 134 (1944).
103. Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 576–77 (2009) (citations omitted) (citing Skidmore, 323
U.S. at 140).
104. Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 140.
105. Williamson v. Mazda Motor of Am., Inc., 562 U.S. 323, 330 (2011).
106. 529 U.S. 861 (2000).
107. Id. at 883.
108. Id.
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C.

The Historical Practice of the Supreme Court and the Advisory
Committee

I am proposing that the Supreme Court or the Advisory Committee
at the time a rule is promulgated include a statement as to its displacement
of state law. How great a change would this be? What kind of comments
have the Court and the Advisory Committee provided in the past?
As to the Supreme Court, there is no tradition of comment on a new
rule’s application in a diversity case. There are the occasional dissents
from a transmission to Congress. Even rarer is the Court declining to
transmit a proposed rule. 109 The dissents are also receding in time, the last
one coming in 1993. 110 And the dissents (let alone the transmittals) do not
address the Erie issue of whether and how the rule will apply in diversity
cases. Very infrequently a dissent raises a question of the rule’s validity
under the Enabling Act. 111 More frequently, they discuss the merits of the
rule itself. 112
More fundamentally, these statements are indeed dissents, not the
voice of the Court. The Court, in transmitting the Rules, does not
comment upon the Rules. For years, the Supreme Court has used a
standard form adopting amendments to the rules that is unadorned with

109. See 535 U.S. 1158 (2002) (declining to transmit proposed Rule of Criminal Procedure);
500 U.S. 963, 964 (1991) (declining to transmit proposed Rules Civil Procedure); see also 507 U.S.
1089, 1093 (1993) (statement of Justice White) (“Only once in my memory did the Court refuse to
transmit some of the rule changes proposed by the Judicial Conference.”).
110. See 507 U.S. 1089, 1096 (1993) (Scalia, J., dissenting). For a collection of the
transmissions to Congress, including dissents, see Wright & Miller, et al., 12A FED. PRAC. & PROC.
CIV. APP. B (2018 ed.) (stating the Orders of the Supreme Court of the United States Adopting and
Amending Rules).
111. See, e.g., Amendments to Rules of Civil Procedure for the United States District Courts,
31 F.R.D. 587, 617 (1963) (Black and Douglas, J., dissenting):
We believe that while some of the Rules of Civil Procedure are simply housekeeping
details, many determine matters so substantially affecting the rights of litigants in law suits
that in practical effect they are the equivalent of new legislation which, in our judgment,
the Constitution requires to be initiated in and enacted by the Congress and approved by
the President. [. . .] Even were there not this constitutional limitation, the authorizing
statute itself qualifies this Court’s power by imposing upon it a solemn responsibility not
to submit rules that “abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right” and by specifically
charging the Court with the duty to “preserve the right to trial by jury as at common law
and as declared by the Seventh Amendment to the Constitution.” Our chief objections to
the rules relate essentially to the fact that many of their provisions do “abridge, enlarge or
modify” substantive rights and do not “preserve the right to trial by jury” but actually
encroach upon it.
112. See, e.g., 368 U.S. 1009, 1012 (1961) (Douglas, J.) (dissenting from amendment to Rule
25 on substitution of parties as “unwise.”).
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explanation or comment. The most recent order adopting and transmitting
amendments, for example, reads as follows:
Ordered:
1. That the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure be, and they
hereby are, amended by including therein amendments to
Civil Rules 5, 23, 62, and 65.1. . . .
2. That the foregoing amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure shall take effect on December 1, 2018, and shall
govern in all proceedings in civil cases thereafter
commenced and, insofar as just and practicable, all
proceedings then pending.
3. That The Chief Justice be, and hereby is, authorized to
transmit to the Congress the foregoing amendments to the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in accordance with the
provisions of Section 2074 of Title 28, United States
Code. 113
The Advisory Committee Notes provide a better stocked pond in which to
fish. The Committee does not often or even regularly comment upon the
relationship between state law and the Rules, but it has done so on
occasion. Most of the Advisory Committee Notes are explanatory as to
the intended operation of the rule, describing the problem the rule is
attempting to fix or the ambiguity it is attempting to clarify. 114 But a small
number of them do address the interaction of the Rules with other law and
in particular with state law.
The Advisory Committee from time to time asserts its role as a
preeminent rulemaker as against other potential sources of rules. This
occurs most often in the context of the Committee acting against local
rules. For example, in the 1991 amendments the Advisory Committee

113. See Journal of the Supreme Court of the United States October 2017 Term at 700 (April
26, 2018). This is the standard form of the transmittal. For other examples across time, see Journal of
the Supreme Court of the United States October 2016 Term at 701–02; 559 U.S. 1140, 1141 (2010);
329 U.S. 843 (1946).
114. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 33 (advisory committee’s note to 1970 amendment):
There are numerous and conflicting decisions on the question whether and to what extent
interrogatories are limited to matters “of fact,” or may elicit opinions, contentions, and
legal conclusions . . . Rule 33 is amended to provide that an interrogatory is not
objectionable merely because it calls for an opinion or contention that relates to fact or the
application of law to fact.
See also Catherine T. Struve, The Paradox of Delegation: Interpreting the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 1099, 1112–13 (2002) (“A survey of Notes to amendments
promulgated since 1988 shows that the Advisory Committee currently uses the Notes to indicate an
amendment’s purpose, guide future interpretations, discuss the amendment’s relation to surrounding
law, and provide practice tips for lawyers and judges.”).
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proposed restricting the power of court clerks to “refuse to accept for
filing papers not conforming to certain requirements of form imposed by
local rules or practice.” 115 The Committee asserted that enforcing local
rules in this way “is not a suitable role for the office of the clerk” and that
this is instead “a role for a judicial officer.” 116 Likewise, in 1995 the
Committee acted to effectuate a “requirement that local rules be consistent
not only with the national rules but also with Acts of Congress.” 117 That
year the Committee also recommended protecting parties from a “loss of
rights in the enforcement of local rules relating to matters of form.” 118 One
should not, for example, lose a right to a jury trial by failing to follow a
local rule requiring jury trial demands to be placed in the caption of the
case in the pleadings. 119 While these amendments do not involve a tension
between the rules and state law, they do show the Committee exercising
its authority to supersede other rulemaking authority and they provide
examples of rule commentary explaining the relationship of the rules to
other sources of law.
On other occasions, the Advisory Committee has carefully
delineated the interaction between state law and the rules. The Advisory
Committee Notes for the 1963 amendments address service of process
under Rule 4. Rule 4(c) at that time provided that “[s]ervice of all process
shall be made by a United States marshal, by his deputy, or by some
person specially appointed by the court for that purpose. . . .” 120 Rule
4(d)(7) provided for service “in the manner prescribed by the law of the
state in which the service is made.” 121 When state law provided for service
via a state official, lower courts held that the state official had to receive
a federal appointment under Rule 4(c) to satisfy the “who” requirement of
Rule 4(c). 122 Even worse, when state law authorized mail service, that
perhaps could not be used under Rule 4 since the mailing would not
involve a United States marshal or deputy or someone specially appointed
by the court as Rule 4(c) seemed to require.
The committee notes rejected that construction, citing with approval
a case holding that: “service in the manner prescribed by the law of the
115. See FED. R. CIV. P. 5 (advisory committee’s note to 1991 amendment).
116. See id.
117. See FED. R. CIV. P. 83 (advisory committee’s note to 1995 amendment).
118. See id.
119. See id.
120. Farr & Co. v. Cia. Intercontinental De Navegacion De Cuba, S. A., 243 F.2d 342, 349 n.15
(2d Cir. 1957).
121. See id. at 347 n.9.
122. See Wright & Miller, et al., 4A FED. PRAC. & PROC. CIV. § 1092 (4th ed.).
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state . . . is not limited by subdivision (c) requiring that service of all
process be made by certain designated persons.” 123 The note concluded
that the “salutary results of these cases are intended to be preserved.” 124
The note thus provided guidance as to how the rulemakers intended state
and federal law to interact. The Advisory Committee returned to this issue
in the 1980 amendments in which they clarified that when service is made
under state law, the persons identified in Rule 4(c) need not be involved
in the service. 125 The former Rule had the troublesome ambiguity noted
above. 126 To solve this, the Advisory Committee recommended amending
Rule 4(c) to explicitly “authorize service of process in all cases by anyone
authorized to make service in the courts of general jurisdiction of the state
in which the district court is held or in which service is made.” 127
There is a similar discussion by the Advisory Committee of the role
of state law in matters of evidence. The original Federal Rule 43 provided
that:
[E]vidence shall be admitted which is admissible under the statutes of
the United States, or under the rules of evidence heretofore applied in
the courts of the United States on the hearing of suits in equity, or under
the rules of evidence applied in the courts of general jurisdiction of the
state in which the United States court is held. 128

Thus, in the absence of a federal evidentiary statute the federal courts were
to borrow (outside of equity cases) state law. Eventually, Congress ratified
the Federal Rules of Evidence. 129 But long before that, the 1946 notes to
Rule 43 made the argument for a set of uniform federal rules to replace
the reliance on state law: a “comprehensive and detailed set of rules of
evidence seems very desirable.” 130 The Advisory Committee was thus
opining that federal rules should be created to displace state law.
To be clear, these are not instances of the Advisory Committee
stating whether a federal rule is intended to preempt state law. The
question addressed under Rule 4 was how two parts of federal law are to
be read together, one of which incorporates state law. And as to Rule 43,

123.
omitted).
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
(1939).
129.
130.
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See id.
See Rules of Civil Procedure for the District Courts of the United States, 308 U.S. 663, 718
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the discussion was of the desirability of a uniform, state-law-preempting
set of federal rules of evidence. They are nonetheless suggestive of what
the Advisory Committee could do in cases of potential conflict between
state and federal law. Why not make a statement in such a situation that
federal law is (or is not) intended to displace state law? This is little
different from the Advisory Committee stating that Rule 4(c)’s list of
persons who are proper process servers does not displace the incorporated
state law concerning the method of service or from the Committee pining
for a set of federal rules that once created would displace state law.
On several occasions the Advisory Committee has addressed the
question of the validity of a rule in light of the powers granted and
withheld in the Rules Enabling Act. 131 Indeed, such discussions appear in
1937, at the very beginning of the federal rules. Federal Rule 3 provided
then and now that a “civil action is commenced by filing a complaint with
the court.” 132 In its 1937 notes, the Advisory Committee raised the issue
of how this provision interacts with a state statute of limitations:
When a Federal or State statute of limitations is pleaded as a defense, a
question may arise under this rule whether the mere filing of the
complaint stops the running of the statute, or whether any further step is
required, such as, service of the summons and complaint or their
delivery to the marshal for service. The answer to this question may
depend on whether it is competent for the Supreme Court, exercising the
power to make rules of procedure without affecting substantive rights,
to vary the operation of statutes of limitations. 133

The rulemakers did not answer the questions they posed—whether Rule
3 applied to toll a state (or federal) statute of limitations and whether Rule
3 thusly interpreted would violate the restrictions of the Enabling Act. The
Supreme Court later had to resolve the issue of the relationship of Rule 3
to state law in Ragan v. Merchants Transfer & Warehouse Co. 134 and
Walker v. Armco Steel Corp. 135 It is odd for a rulemaker to provide
commentary raising an important issue and then neglect to answer it. The
rulemakers did not say that they were declining to answer the
interpretative and validity questions out of deference to the Supreme
Court later deciding the matter, but that is the practical effect of what it
131. See generally 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (2012).
132. Compare FED. R. CIV. P. 3., with Civil Procedure for the District Courts of the United
States, 308 U.S. 645, 664 (1939) (original rule).
133. FED. R. CIV. P. 3 (advisory committee’s note to 1937 amendment) (emphasis added).
134. 337 U.S. 530 (1949).
135. 446 U.S. 740 (1980).
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did. This commentary thus can be taken as an instance of the Advisory
Committee consciously avoiding a role of addressing a question of a rule’s
validity.
A similar approach seems to be reflected in the 1993 amendments to
Rule 4(k). That rule was amended in that year to “enable[] district courts
to exercise jurisdiction, if permissible under the Constitution and not
precluded by statute, when a federal claim is made against a defendant not
subject to the jurisdiction of any single state.” 136 The drafters of the rule
were apparently concerned that it might transgress the Enabling Act, and
so added this “Special Note”: “Mindful of the constraints of the Rules
Enabling Act, the Committee calls the attention of the Supreme Court and
Congress to new subdivision (k)(2). Should this limited extension of
service be disapproved, the Committee nevertheless recommends
adoption of the balance of the rule. . . .” 137 The Advisory Committee
provided a little gloss on its Enabling Act concerns, noting that the new
rule would not apply in diversity cases: “This narrow extension of the
federal reach applies only if a claim is made against the defendant under
federal law. It does not establish personal jurisdiction if the only claims
are those arising under state law.” 138 But the notes do not explain why as
a matter of policy the rule would apply only in federal question cases. An
earlier version of the Advisory Committee Notes, however, was more
transparent. The “Special Note” in this version did not refer to the
Enabling Act at all and was in that way less informative. 139 But the
commentary said, “[t]his narrow extension of the federal reach is
inapplicable to cases in which federal jurisdiction rests on the diversity of
citizenship of the parties. This is perhaps a necessary application of the
principle of Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). 140
Taken together, the earlier draft of the Advisory Committee Notes
specifically flagged an Erie issue by name and suggested that the
proposed rule might be rejected. The final draft of the commentary
seemed to soften the warning. It was specific in mentioning the Enabling
136. FED. R. CIV. P. 4 (advisory committee’s note to 1993 amendment); see also Fed. R. Civ. P.
4(k)(2).
137. See Amendments to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 146 F.R.D. 401, 557–58 (1993).
138. FED. R. CIV. P. 4 (advisory committee’s note to 1993 amendment).
139. The September 1990 report of the Advisory Committee to the Standing Committee stated
as follows: “Special Note: If paragraph (k)(2) of the proposed revision of Rule 4 is disapproved by
the Congress, it is nevertheless recommended that the rule be approved with the deletion of the
paragraph, which is separable from the revised rule. . . .” Summary of the Report of the Judicial
Conference Committee on the Rules of Practice and Procedure, 41, USCOURTS.GOV
http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/fr_import/ST09-1990.pdf
[https://perma.cc/28DSRMAG].
140. Id. at 62.
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Act as a concern, but it deleted the reference to the Erie doctrine. Once
again, we see the Advisory Committee raising but not answering an Erie
issue (one of validity) in the commentary. And its apparent softening of
its stated concern by deleting the reference to Erie might be taken as
another indicator that it believed it should leave the issue open for the
Court to later decide.
There are two other instances of the Advisory Committee discussing
the validity of a federal rule. The 1993 amendments to Rule 11 added a
provision for monetary sanctions against a represented party but provided
that a monetary sanction against a client could not be imposed for
frivolous contentions of law. Here, the Advisory Committee very
explicitly offered its opinion on the Enabling Act question: “With this
limitation, the rule should not be subject to attack under the Rules
Enabling Act.” 141 Similarly, in the original notes on Rule 35 (which
provides for court-ordered physical examinations) the Advisory
Committee noted that prior caselaw had upheld the constitutionality of
examination orders, provided that there was statutory authority. The
Enabling Act, the Advisory Committee said, provided the necessary
authority. 142 In contrast to its diffidence when presenting Rule 4(k)(2), the
Advisory Committee in these instances unabashedly made an explicit
endorsement of a rule’s validity.
Finally, there are a few instances where the Advisory Committee has
directly addressed the question of a federal rule’s displacement of state
law. Rule 49 in its original form (and today as well) allows a court to use
a special verdict form. 143 The original Advisory Committee comments
tersely state that the “Federal courts are not bound to follow state statutes
authorizing or requiring the court to ask a jury to find a special verdict or
to answer interrogatories.” 144 On its face, this is a direct answer to a
question of the operation of the federal rule as against state law, which
sounds like an Erie question. But the Advisory Committee was not
answering an Erie question. Erie was decided in 1938 145 and the Advisory
Committee Note dates to 1937. The Advisory Committee was relying on
cases decided under the Conformity Act, which generally directed that
federal courts use the procedure of the state courts of the state in which

141. FED. R. CIV. P. 11 (advisory committee’s note to 1993 amendment).
142. FED. R. CIV. P. 35 (advisory committee’s note to 1937 amendment).
143. See Rules of Civil Procedure for the District Courts of the United States, 308 U.S. 663, 724
(1939); FED. R. CIV. P. 49.
144. FED. R. CIV. P. 49 (advisory committee’s note to 1937 amendment).
145. See Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
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they sat. 146 But that Act was not interpreted to require federal courts to
conform to the manner of returning a jury verdict. 147 Cases under the
Conformity Act may be thought of as pre-Erie, inside-out Erie cases,
because they were decided before Erie and operated under a command to
use state procedural law while preserving some autonomy to federal law,
a reversal of the normal Erie context. As the Supreme Court put it in a
pre-Erie case, “the function of the trial judge in a federal court is not in
any sense a local matter, and state statutes which would interfere with the
appropriate performance of that function are not binding upon the federal
court under either the Conformity Act or the ‘Rules of Decision’ Act.” 148
The Conformity Act and Erie questions are structurally identical, differing
only in their reversed polarity. And thus the comment about Rule 49 and
state law can be taken as an authoritative pronouncement by the Advisory
Committee on the preeminence of a federal rule over state law when the
two conflict.
The 1946 amendments to Rule 23 provide the clearest example of
the Advisory Committee addressing whether a federal rule displaces state
law. 149 At that time, Rule 23 provided that in derivative actions the
plaintiff must have been a “shareholder at the time of the transaction of
which he complains or that his share thereafter devolved on him by
operation of law.” The Advisory Committee then noted that as “a result
of the decision in Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, a question has arisen as to
whether the provision above quoted deals with a matter of substantive
right or is a matter of procedure.” The solution of the Advisory Committee
was to let the Erie question be settled in the courts, contenting itself with
providing a long explanation of the issue. After reviewing the caselaw,
the commentary concluded that “the question is a debatable one . . . [with
a] recent trend towards the view that Rule 23(b)(1) is procedural.” The
Advisory Committee thus avoided giving its opinion on the question of
validity. It’s reticence perhaps was motivated by a concern that an official
comment that spoke of the rule’s validity would be binding in later
litigation were the Supreme Court to adopt the rule with that selfvalidating commentary. Instead, the Advisory Committee thought the
question was “one which should not be decided by the Supreme Court ex
parte, but left to await a judicial decision in a litigated case. . . . “ 150 This
146. See Act of June 1, 1872, c. 255, § 5, 17 Stat. 197; see Wright & Miller et al., History of
Federal Procedure Under Statute, 4 FED. PRAC. & PROC. CIV. § 1002 (4th ed.).
147. FED. R. CIV. P. 49 (advisory committee’s note to 1937 amendment).
148. See Herron v. S. Pac. Co., 283 U.S. 91, 94 (1931).
149. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23 (advisory committee’s note to 1946 amendment).
150. FED. R. CIV. P. 23 (advisory committee’s note to 1937 amendment) (emphasis added).
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is an exact example of what I am considering here: the Advisory
Committee opining on an Erie, state law displacement issue. But the
Advisory Committee sidled up to expressing an opinion only to recoil
from doing so. It was preferable, the Advisory Committee believed, for
the Court to decide the matter in the course of litigation rather than in the
isolation of a rulemaking body.
The pattern to be drawn from the Advisory Committee Notes is one
of caution. The Advisory Committee has ultimately refrained from stating
its opinion on whether a federal rule displaces state law. It has been more
open in asserting the validity of its rules under the Enabling Act, but that
should not be a surprise: the Advisory Committee can hardly pass along a
recommendation for a rule it believes is invalid, and saying explicitly that
it believes the rule to be valid is not giving away too much of the plot. But
when the question is whether the rule displaces state law, the rulemakers
are more reticent. This is informative for our purposes and will be
considered later. 151
IV. ADVANTAGES OF FRONT-LOADING THE ERIE ISSUE
The case for front-loading the Erie question is relatively
straightforward. The issue would be decided ex ante as a part of the
rulemaking process. Parties would know where they stand. The federal
judicial system would benefit from an increase in efficiency by lessening
parasitic litigation about litigation. States would also benefit in their
attempts to promote substantive policies in instances in which the
rulemakers decline to displace state law. And the entire Erie enterprise
would become more coherent.
A.

Private Benefits to the Parties

Addressing the Erie issue of whether a federal rule is to displace state
law at the point of promulgation would be helpful to private parties. In
general, legal uncertainty interferes with one’s ability to privately order
commercial and other relationships and to adhere to regulatory
requirements. 152 One way in which the law can be uncertain is in its scope

151. See infra notes 251, 243, 255–57 and accompanying text.
152. See William J. Woodward, Jr., Legal Uncertainty and Aberrant Contracts: The Choice of
Law Clause, 89 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 197 (2014) (“The most obvious activity threatened by legal
uncertainty is planning, an activity that requires at least some ability to predict the future
consequences of today’s actions.”); Stephen G. Gilles, The Supreme Court and Legal Uncertainty, 60
DEPAUL L. REV. 311 (2011).
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of application. Even if parties know with mathematical certainty the
content of all the law in the world on a given topic, if they do not know
which of those laws will apply to them, they are left as unprepared as if
the substance of the law itself was indeterminate. In fact, this very
uncertainty in the law to be applied (state or federal) was one of the
rationales underlying Erie. 153
The case history of Shady Grove Orthopedic Associates, P.A. v.
Allstate Insurance Co., 154 is illustrative. The case was originally filed on
April 20, 2006 in the United States District Court for the Eastern District
of New York. 155 In July 2006 Allstate moved to dismiss the case, 156
arguing that a New York statute that provided that “an action to recover a
penalty, or minimum measure of recovery created or imposed by statute
may not be maintained as a class action” 157 applied to prevent class
certification even if the requirements of Federal Rule 23 were met. The
District Court granted the motion on December 15, 2006, ruling that New
York law applied despite Federal Rule 23. 158 On November 19, 2008, the
Second Circuit affirmed. 159 The Supreme Court reversed on March 31,
2010, holding that Federal Rule 23, not New York law, governed class
certification. 160 The case was remanded back to the District Court and

153. See Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 74 (1938):
Experience in applying the doctrine of Swift v. Tyson, had revealed its defects. . . .
Persistence of state courts in their own opinions on questions of common law prevented
uniformity; and the impossibility of discovering a satisfactory line of demarcation between
the province of general law and that of local law developed a new well of uncertainties.
154. 559 U.S. 393 (2010).
155. See Class Action Complaint, Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co,
466 F. Supp. 2d 467 (E.D.N.Y. 2006), aff’d, 549 F.3d 137 (2d Cir. 2008), rev’d, 559 U.S. 393 (2010),
and vacated and remanded, 380 Fed. Appx. 96 (2d Cir. 2010) (No. CV 06 1842).
156. See Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendant Allstate Insurance Company’s Motion
to Dismiss Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A, 466 F. Supp.
2d 467 (E.D.N.Y. 2006) (No. CV 06 1842).
157. See N.Y. C.P.L.R. 901(b) (McKinney 1975).
158. Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A.,466 F. Supp. 2d 467 (E.D.N.Y. 2006). Without class
certification, the small claim plaintiff would not satisfy the amount in controversy requirement of 28
U.S.C. § 1332. See id. at 475. Were class certification available, then the claim aggregation rule of 28
U.S.C. § 1332(d) would have granted jurisdiction. See Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v.
Allstate Ins. Co., 559 U.S. 393, 397 & n.3 (2010).
159. Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 549 F.3d 137 (2d Cir. 2008),
rev’d, 559 U.S. 393 (2010).
160. Parts of the opinion were a plurality, but a majority of Justices joined part I(A), which
concluded that the New York rule against class certification “cannot apply in diversity suits unless
Rule 23 is ultra vires.” Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 559 U.S. 393, 399
(2010).
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eventually settled in August 2014. 161 Thus, from filing to resolution a little
over eight years passed. Of course, any case that involves a trip to the
Supreme Court and back will have a long chronology. But the length of
this particular litigation was due precisely to the uncertainty of the
applicability of Rule 23. Once the Supreme Court decided that issue, the
class was certified and the case soon settled, 162 as is often the case with
class actions. 163 Had the applicability of Rule 23 been known in advance,
years would have been shaved off the litigation.
Uncertainty about the applicability of a federal rule can also lead to
enhanced forum-shopping. And the term “enhanced” is not intended as a
mere throwaway adjective. It denotes an additional level of forumshopping. In the Erie context, we normally worry about forum-shopping
between federal and state court. When uncertainty exists as to whether a
federal rule applies in diversity cases, 164 parties may shop among federal
courts, choosing between one that applies state law and one that applies
federal law. This would be, then, forum-shopping to gain an advantage in
forum-shopping.
A hypothetical based on Stewart Organization, Inc. v. Ricoh Corp. 165
illustrates the point. The parties in that case had negotiated a forumselection clause exclusively choosing Manhattan as a forum. 166 Despite
that, the plaintiff sued in Alabama. Alabama law looked unfavorably on
forum-selection clauses. 167 The Erie question was whether Alabama law
controlled (viewing the validity of the forum-selection clause as simply a

161. See Docket 1:06-CV-01842, Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co,
466 F. Supp. 2d 467 (E.D.N.Y. 2006), aff’d, 549 F.3d 137 (2d Cir. 2008), rev’d, 559 U.S. 393 (2010),
and vacated and remanded, 380 Fed. Appx. 96 (2d Cir. 2010) (No. CV 06 1842), ECF No. 126.
162. The docket sheet shows that the District Court certified the class on August 7, 2013. The
stipulation of settlement was filed on December 20, 2013. Id.
163. It is generally understood that class certification often leads to a settlement of the case. See
Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc., 573 U.S. 258, 2424 n.7 (2014) (referring to the
“substantial in terrorem settlement pressures brought to bear by certification”) (Thomas, J.,
concurring); George Rutherglen, The Way Forward After Wal-Mart, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 871,
895 (2012) (“[C]ertification itself affects the probability of settlement. Cases that are not certified are
likely to be dropped, resulting in no significant settlement for the class, while cases that are certified
usually proceed immediately to serious settlement negotiations.”).
164. For an example of such a split among the federal courts, see Stinnett v. United States, 891
F. Supp. 2d 858, 866 n.9 (M.D. Tenn. 2012) (noting courts are “split on whether state law medical
malpractice certificate pleading requirements constitute (a) substantive state law that federal courts
must enforce, or (b) procedural requirements that are trumped by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
particularly Rule 8.”).
165. 487 U.S. 22 (1988).
166. See id. at 24.
167. See id.
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matter of Alabama contract law) or federal law (28 U.S.C. § 1404, the
transfer of venue statute) applied. If federal law applied, the case would
be litigated in New York; if state law applied, the litigation would stay
where the case was filed, in Alabama. The Eleventh Circuit held that
federal law applied and that the case should be transferred; 168 a result
ultimately upheld by the Supreme Court. 169 But suppose that the
defendant had been subject to personal jurisdiction in a number of circuits
and those circuits had split on whether a state law antipathy to forumselections clauses survives the contrary impulse of § 1404. A plaintiff, to
whom avoiding a Manhattan forum was very important, would then have
the opportunity to shop among federal courts to obtain favorable law on
whether state or federal law applies, a multi-layered exercise in forumshopping.
Or consider the requirement of some states that a medical
malpractice complaint be accompanied by an affidavit of probable cause
from a person qualified as an expert. There is a split on whether such
requirements are applicable in diversity or whether Rule 8’s short plain
statement requirement displaces them. 170 Again assuming that the
defendant is subject to personal jurisdiction in more than one circuit and
that these circuits have split on this question, the plaintiff would have an
opportunity to shop for a forum in the circuit which holds that Rule 8 does
displace such state law requirements. 171 The possibility of such forumshopping destabilizes the certainty and expectations that the parties
otherwise could have enjoyed.

168. See Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 810 F.2d 1066 (11th Cir. 1987) (en banc), aff’d and
remanded, 487 U.S. 22 (1988).
169. See Stewart, 487 U.S. at 32.
170. See Jones v. Corr. Med. Servs., Inc., 845 F. Supp. 2d 824, 853–54 & n.11 (W.D. Mich.
2012) (noting the split and collecting cases); Meryl J. Thomas, The Merits of Procedure vs. Substance:
Erie, Iqbal, and Affidavits of Merit As Medmal Reform, 52 ARIZ. L. REV. 1135, 1137 (2010); Benjamin
Grossberg, Uniformity, Federalism, and Tort Reform: The Erie Implications of Medical Malpractice
Certificate of Merit Statutes, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 217, 227 (2010); Samuel L. Bray, Preventive
Adjudication, 77 U. CHI. L. REV. 1275, 1298 (2010) (“[I]ndeterminacies in the application of law are
costly: it is hard for people to act and plan when they do not know the precise legal consequences of
their actions.”).
171. It is possible that each of the states from among which the plaintiff is shopping has such a
statute. Alternatively, such a statute existing at the place the malpractice action arose could be
regarded as substantive for horizontal (state-to-state) choice of law purposes—being designed to
lower medical costs by reducing malpractice litigation—and thus, applicable even in actions filed in
other state or federal courts.
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Public Benefits to the Judicial System

Declaring the displacing effect of a federal rule at the time of
promulgation would also benefit the legal system. Uncertainty costs the
courts as well as litigants. All litigation consumes resources. Since courts
are funded by the public, litigation consumes not just private but public
resources. The cost of litigation may be viewed as necessary to the
functioning of a society governed by a rule of law. No one wants litigation,
but it is both inevitable and preferable to the alternative of self-help. But
litigation does not create new social wealth, it merely redistributes slices
of the existing pie. For these reasons, the cost of litigation should be kept
as low as possible consistent with the competing requirements of
procedural fairness and accuracy of decision making.
Some litigation, however, is especially unproductive. Our system of
justice requires us to sometimes litigate not about the merits of the case
but about preliminary matters, such as pleading or jurisdiction. These are
instances of litigation about litigation. As the Supreme Court said in the
context of subject-matter jurisdiction, “[u]ncertainty regarding the
question of jurisdiction is particularly undesirable, and collateral litigation
on the point particularly wasteful.” 172 Litigation over where litigation is
to occur (i.e. jurisdiction) requires “the courts and the parties [to] expend
great energy, not on the merits of dispute settlement, but on simply
deciding whether a court has the power to hear a case.” 173 The same is
true of litigation about what procedures are to be used. The examples
discussed above are examples of such unproductive litigation over
litigation (forum-selection clauses or pleading). A system that could
lessen the presentation of such questions would benefit the judicial system
as a whole.
A second public cost of Erie uncertainty is interference with a state’s
ability to implement its desired social policy. Gasperini v. Center for
Humanities, Inc., 174 illustrates the problem. As a part of tort reform, in
1986, New York enacted a new, more rigorous, standard for review of the
size of jury verdicts. If the jury award “deviates materially from what
would be reasonable compensation,” the appellate court was empowered
to set aside the judgment. 175 Right or wrong, New York had decided that

172.
173.
174.
175.

Grupo Dataflux v. Atlas Glob. Grp., L.P., 541 U.S. 567, 582 (2004).
See United States v. Sisson, 399 U.S. 267, 307 (1970).
518 U.S. 415 (1996).
See id. at 423.
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greater surveillance 176 of jury awards was necessary as a matter of
policy. 177 Thus the “State’s objective [was] manifestly substantive.” 178
But that policy could easily be circumvented if a plaintiff in a diversity
case could go to federal court and receive the benefit of the more forgiving
shock the conscience test for reviewing the size of verdicts. 179 In the
fullness of time, the Supreme Court decided that in diversity cases federal
courts must indeed apply the deviates materially standard, 180 but this took
about 10 years to work out. In the meantime, New York’s policy
objectives—the very substantive one of lowering malpractice
premiums 181—suffered. The same harm to state interests can occur in
other contexts when lower courts erroneously deny effect to state laws
that eventually are deemed not displaced by federal rules.
C.

The Process of Deciding the Erie Issue Would be Improved

The Hanna wing of the Erie doctrine is currently beset by several
thorny problems. Is the federal rule in question sufficiently broad to
control the issue? 182 Is there a direct collision between the rule and state
law? 183 Was it intended that the rule apply to the situation at all? 184 Is this
latter question a matter of textual rule interpretation or do Erie policies,
such as a regard for state substantive interests, play a role? 185 If the Erie
issue of state law displacement were front-loaded into rule promulgation,
this side of the Erie analytical machine would run much more smoothly.
Under our current Erie practice, when a federal rule is offered up
against state law Hanna directs that the federal rule applies so long as it

176. See id. at 424.
177. See Brief for Respondent, Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415 (1996) (No.
95-719), 1996 WL 143322 at *44, (characterizing the case as presenting “fundamental policy
judgments by the state concerning the nature and extent of compensation available to injured
persons. . . . “).
178. See Gasperini, 518 U.S. at 429.
179. See id. at 422. The “shock the conscious” standard insulates a jury award from challenges
to its size unless “the proceedings have been tainted by appeals to prejudice or if the verdict, in the
light of the evidence, is so unreasonable that it would be unconscionable to permit it to stand.” Wright
& Miller et al., 11 FED. PRAC. & PROC. CIV. § 2807 (3d ed.).
180. See id. at 430. The New York standard “authorized much greater judicial control over the
verdict” than the federal “shocks the conscience” standard. Wright & Miller et al., 11 FED. PRAC. &
PROC. § 2802 (3d ed.).
181. See id. at 423 n.3.
182. See Walker v. Armco Steel Corp., 446 U.S. 740, 749–50 (1980).
183. See Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 472 (1965).
184. See supra notes 30–39 and accompanying text.
185. See supra notes 45–53 and accompanying text.
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is pertinent (intended to govern the situation at hand) 186 and valid (within
the grant of the Rules Enabling Act). 187 The validity check is all but
meaningless. The Rules Enabling Act grants authority to the Supreme
Court to “prescribe general rules of practice and procedure,” but provides
that such “rules shall not abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive
right.” 188 Under the prevailing test, first set out in Sibbach v. Wilson &
Co., 189 a rule is valid as within the Enabling Act if it really regulates
procedure. 190 This test has been much criticized 191 and provides almost no
restriction on the validity of a rule. 192 Its error is in assuming that
procedure and substance are binary and mutually exclusive categories.193
If a rule is procedural, it falls within the grant of power to prescribe rules
of procedure and, it follows from this binary approach, the rule also does
not transgress the prohibition of altering substantive rights.
The problem cases under Hanna are those in which an ostensibly
pertinent federal rule is held to be nonapplicable in a diversity case.
Walker v. Armco Steel Corp. 194 and Gasperini v. Center for Humanities,

186. See Robert J. Condlin, “A Formstone of Our Federalism”: The Erie/Hanna Doctrine &
Casebook Law Reform, 59 U. MIAMI L. REV. 475, 508–09 (2005) (Hanna establishes that if there is
“a Federal Rule . . . pertinent to the issue before the federal court . . . [t]he court must apply the
Federal Rule.”).
187. See supra notes 13–16 and accompanying text.
188. 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (2012).
189. 312 U.S. 1, 14 (1941).
190. See id.
191. See Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 559 U.S. 393, 412–13
(2010) (Scalia, J.) (plurality opinion) (“Sibbach’s exclusive focus on the challenged Federal Rule . . .
is hard to square with § 2072(b)’s terms”) id. at 422; Jeffrey O. Cooper, Summary Judgment in the
Shadow of Erie, 43 AKRON L. REV. 1245, 1251 (2010) (referring to the “broad (and rather unhelpful)
language of Sibbach v. Wilson”); Doernberg, supra note 15, at 1178 (“There is voluminous
commentary on REA. Much of it criticizes Sibbach and the Court’s repetition of the Sibbach test in
Hanna.”); The Sibbach test “is no test at all” but instead “little more than a statement that a matter is
procedural if, by revelation, it is procedural.” Wright & Miller et al., 19 FED. PRAC. & PROC. JURIS.
§ 4509 (3d ed.); Note, The Rules Enabling Act and the Limits of Rule 23, 111 HARV. L. REV. 2294,
2297 (1998).
192. See Gregory Gelfand Howard, Putting Erie on the Right Track, 49 U. PITT. L. REV. 937,
1005 (1988) (explaining the statutory limitation again abridging or enlarging substantive rights “was
read to mean absolutely nothing.”).
193. See Martin H. Redish & Dennis Murashko, The Rules Enabling Act and the ProceduralSubstantive Tension: A Lesson in Statutory Interpretation, 93 MINN. L. REV. 26, 37 (2008) (“When
the original Rules Enabling Act was promulgated into law in 1934, many of its supporters believed
that procedure and substance were indeed mutually exclusive”); Sibbach ignored “the possibility that
a Rule could fairly be labeled procedural and at the same time abridge or modify substantive rights.”
Ely, supra note 4, at 719.
194. See Walker v. Armco Steel Corp., 446 U.S. 740, 750 (1980) (quoting Hanna v. Plumer,
380 U.S. 460, 470 (1965).
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Inc., 195 are examples. In such cases, “the Court minimized the damage of
Sibbach’s wooden . . . interpretation of the Enabling Act primarily by
interpreting Federal Rules not to govern the matter in issue.” 196 The
federalism concern of interference with state substantive policy was
attended to, despite Sibbach and Hanna’s categorical rigor, by
“examining the state policy purpose underlying the law being displaced,
and by using creative interpretive approaches to avoid applying particular
Rules.” 197 But the problem with such an approach is its lack of
predictability. There is a mismatch between the Court’s motive
(protecting state interests) and its stated methods (interpreting a rule as
being not intended to apply). 198 The Court does not reveal its inner
analytical processes. Indeed, it has sometimes been affirmatively
misleading 199 in its use of rule interpretation as a means of deciding rule
applicability in diversity cases. One is left trying to psychoanalyze the
Court, trying to deduce its inner mental life from its outer behavior. In
short, the Court has been using the wrong tool for the job—using a rule
intent and rule interpretation analysis—when it is really addressing the
proper exercise of power under the Enabling Act. Reading the Hanna line
of cases is like watching someone use a garden shear to slice a pizza (or
trim a hedge with a pizza slicer). One can do it, but neither the process nor
the end result is pleasing.
Were the rulemakers to opine on the displacement of state law, the
Erie-Hanna analytical scheme would be much more straightforward.
According to the caselaw, the displacement of state law by a federal rule
turns on some conception of the drafters’ intent as to the applicability of
the rule—rules intended to apply to the matter at hand trump state law
under the Supremacy Clause. 200 This may be a quest for the actual
historical intent of the drafters. More likely, the characterization of the
drafters’ intent is shaped underlying Erie polices. Under this view, the
195. 518 U.S. 415, 422–23 (1996); see supra note 40 for a discussion of Gasperini.
196. Stephen B. Burbank & Tobias Barrington Wolff, Redeeming the Missed Opportunities of
Shady Grove, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 17, 31 (2010).
197. See Thomas, supra note 15, at 207.
198. See Rensberger, supra note 15, at 1603 (“[T]he only possible conclusion is that the Court
is employing some canon of construction to decide not that a federal rule is invalid but instead that it
was not intended to apply”).
199. See Walker, 446 U.S. at 750 n.9 (“[S]tating that the federal rules are not “to be narrowly
construed in order to avoid a ‘direct collision’ with state law” and that they should “be given their
plain meaning.”).
200. See id. at 750 (“[T]here is no indication that the Rule was intended” to apply to the matter
at hand); Cf. Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22, 27 (1988) (pertaining to the federal
procedural statute, if “Congress intended to reach the issue before the District Court . . . that is the
end of the matter.”).
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Supreme Court manipulates the intent inquiry to reach a result it finds
conformable to its sense of the appropriate balance between state and
federal law. 201 If we are concerned with actual intent, a statement from the
drafters of the rule would seem dispositive. 202 Consider how Rule 3 would
have been analyzed as an Erie issue in Walker v. Armco Steel Corp. 203 had
the Advisory Committee stated in the notes that the rule was “intended to
displace state law on tolling” or that it was not so intended. The Erie issue
as the Court addressed it (analyzing the intent of the Rule) would have
been effectively decided.
Even if the Court is, on the other hand, using a fictive construct of
intent, that is in reality a product of analyzing the play of the Erie policies,
such a statement from the drafters would still be hard to surmount. In the
face of an Advisory Committee Note saying that the rule is intended to
apply over state law in diversity cases, it is hard to see how the Court
could say with any plausibility that the rule was not intended to apply. Of
course, it may be that the Court should be deciding that a federal rule
displaces state law only after engaging in an Erie policy analysis. If one
takes that position, one might be troubled that the Court, being hemmed
in by the Advisory Committee Notes, is left without the option of deeming
a federal rule inapplicable as against state law. But there is a relief valve
if the Court believes that a rule should not apply based on concerns of
forum-shopping or interference with state substantive interests. The Court
could find the rule invalid under the Enabling Act.
The scheme I am proposing would shift the Court’s supervision of
the federal rules’ interaction with state law from applicability to validity.
This would be a reversal of current practice in which validity is assured
by a lax test and all the decision making on displacing state law is done
under the heading of applicability. Forcing the Supreme Court to address
Erie concerns at the level of validity would serve the ends of transparency.
When the Court says, in a case like Walker, that a rule was not intended
to apply, it really is thinking, I believe, that the rule should not apply in
diversity cases because of Erie policies. It would be better for all of us—
lawyers, judges, and academics—if the Court could speak the language of
201. See supra notes 44–53 and accompanying text.
202. For a discussion of the role of the Advisory Committee Notes in interpreting the rules, see
Catherine T. Struve, supra note 114, at 1152–69. Since under Hanna the question posed by the legal
test is one of intent of the drafters, not the meaning of the words, presumably even Justice Scalia at
his textualist apogee would agree to resort to the notes. Compare Tome v. United States, 513 U.S.
150, 167–68 (1995) (Scalia, J., concurring) (“[T]he promulgated Rule says what it says, regardless of
the intent of its drafters.”).
203. See Walker, 446 U.S. at 750 (quoting Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 470 (1965)).
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its thoughts. It has made a tentative move in the direction of transparency
by admitting that “Federal courts have interpreted the Federal Rules . . .
with sensitivity to important state interests and regulatory policies,”204 but
this still leaves all the heavy lifting on the side of interpretation, where it
does not belong. We are left, for example, with Rule 3 being interpreted
as not intended to apply to the question of tolling for statutes of limitations
in diversity cases but being so intended in cases based on federal law.205
This is needlessly inscrutable. It would be better for the rule drafters to
say either that the rule is intended to apply only in federal question cases
(and thus avoid the problem) or say that it is intended to apply to all cases,
in which case the Supreme Court must decide whether such interference
with state statutes of limitations violates the Enabling Act. When
addressing that question, the Court in litigation might accord some
deference—the mild Skidmore deference 206—to the rulemakers’ analysis
of a need to displace state law. But ultimately the matter of validity would
be for the Court to decide.
Shifting the Court’s Erie supervision from applicability to validity
would require overruling Sibbach and Hanna. The court would be unable
to protect state interests or limit forum-shopping if it retained the low bar
of validity set out in Sibbach. But the departure of Sibbach would be
lamented by few and pleasing to many. 207 In Shady Grove, Justice Stevens
moved in the direction I am proposing. After explaining the first step of
deciding the scope of the rule,208 Justice Stevens moved to the validity
step. If the rule “appears to abridge, enlarge, or modify a substantive
right,” a court should “consider whether the rule can reasonably be
interpreted to avoid that impermissible result.” 209 But if such an
interpretation is not reasonably available “and the rule would violate the
Enabling Act, federal courts cannot apply the rule.” 210 And to be valid,
federal rules must not only satisfy the first part of the Enabling Act (they
must regulate procedure) they also must not violate its second limitation
(not altering substantive rights). The error of Sibbach, Justice Stevens
said, is that “it ignores the second limitation that such rules also ‘not

204. See Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415 (1996).
205. See supra notes 38–39 and accompanying text.
206. See supra notes 102–08 and accompanying text.
207. See supra notes 191–93 and accompanying text.
208. See Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 559 U.S. 393, 421 (2010)
(Stevens, J., concurring) (“The court must first determine whether the scope of the federal rule is
‘sufficiently broad’ to ‘control the issue’ before the court . . .”).
209. See id. at 422–23.
210. See id. at 423.
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abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right.’” 211 Thus a federal rule
is invalid if it “would displace a state law that is . . . so intertwined with a
state right or remedy that it functions to define the scope of the statecreated right.” 212
Having the rulemakers offer preemption statements would
completely eliminate some Erie-Hanna problems. If the Advisory
Committee truly did not intend to displace state law, it could say so in its
notes. Even better, if it wants to assure the satisfaction of textualists, it
could put the non-displacement in the rule itself. 213 In fact, the drafters
have done this on occasion; relation back of amended pleadings under
Federal Rule 15 is proper if the test set forth in rule 15(c) is satisfied or
when “the law that provides the applicable statute of limitations allows
relation back.” 214 Thus in a diversity case, where state law provides the
statute of limitations, if relation back is permitted by state law it is also
allowed under Rule 15, even if the test otherwise set forth in Rule 15 is
not satisfied. There is no Erie issue under a federal rule such as this. The
rule drafters have taken it off the table by saying that the federal standard
need not be satisfied if the state standard is. A similar example is found in
Federal Rule of Evidence 50; it provides that “in a civil case, state law
governs privilege regarding a claim or defense for which state law
supplies the rule of decision.” 215 The drafters of Rule 501 directly
addressed the decision not to displace state law: “The rationale underlying
the proviso is that federal law should not supersede that of the States in
substantive areas such as privilege absent a compelling reason.” 216
The Advisory Committee could have made similar statements for
Rule 3 on the tolling of the statute of limitations. Had Rule 3 (or its notes)
said that the Rule was not intended to be used for tolling a state statute of
limitations, the Court would not have needed to decide Walker and Ragan.
There is a parallel to the elimination of possible preemption in
administrative law. As noted above, agency statements of preemption are
given some weight by the Court. 217 But when an agency states an opinion
of no preemption, that is decisive. The court will lock in the agency nonpreemption opinion under Chevron deference. 218
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.
216.
217.
218.

Id. at 424.
See id. at 423.
See supra note 202 & accompanying text.
FED. R. CIV. P. 15.
FED. R. EVID. 501.
FED. R. EVID. 501 (advisory committee’s notes to 1974 enactment).
See supra notes 101–08 and accompanying text.
See Funk, supra note 86, at 1253:
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Finally, any concern that such scheme would lead to overreach by
the Advisory Committee or the Supreme Court is alleviated by the review
Congress provides. Although seldom exercised, 219 Congress does have
the power to decline to adopt a proposed rule. 220 Congress used this power
to reject and alter proposed Federal Rules of Evidence. It acted out of a
concern that proposed rules on privilege “were likely to have an effect on
the substantive rights of individual citizens” 221 and that “the proposed
Rules were too substantive to be promulgated by the Court and . . .
violated the federalism principles set out in Erie.” 222 Congress can
similarly police the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for federalism
concerns. Indeed, having the Advisory Committee comment on the
displacement of state law and having the Supreme Court in litigated cases
transparently address validity issues rather than hide behind a
smokescreen of rule interpretation would aid Congress in overseeing the
creation of the rules.
The most difficult problem with having the Advisory Committee
make preemption (or non-preemption) statements is that federal rules do
not operate in opposition to a uniform body of state law. Each state’s law
is potentially different. One argument for not displacing state law is
concern that the state law in question is tied up with substantive rights.
But one conflicting state law may have substantive motivations, and
another may not. For example, in Shady Grove Orthopedic Associates,

When an agency expresses an opinion that a regulation does not have preemptive effect,
courts are much more likely to afford Chevron deference to that opinion. For example, in
Hillsborough County v. Automated Medical Laboratories, Inc., although Congress had not
explicitly provided the FDA with any authority to make preemption determinations
regarding the federal regulation of biological products, the Court gave Chevron deference
to the agency’s statement in the preamble that the regulation would not preempt state law.
Thus, there is an asymmetry between judicial consideration of an agency’s opinion that a
statute or regulation does preempt state law and an agency’s opinion that a statute or
regulation does not preempt state law.
219. For a discussion of Congressional rejections of proposed rules, see Karen Nelson Moore,
The Supreme Court’s Role in Interpreting the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 44 HASTINGS L.J.
1039, 1053–60 (1993).
220. See 28 U.S.C. § 2074 (2012):
[T]he Supreme Court shall transmit to the Congress not later than May 1 of the year in
which a rule prescribed under section 2072 is to become effective a copy of the proposed
rule. Such rule shall take effect no earlier than December 1 of the year in which such rule
is so transmitted unless otherwise provided by law.
221. Alan Nichols, Gatekeeping the Gatekeeper: Judicial Rulemaking Authority in Several
States, 48 U. TOL. L. REV. 585, 607 (2017); see also David P. Leonard, Introduction, 38 LOY. L.A.
L. REV. 515, 515–16 (2004) (“[T]he issue of privileges became contentious when Congress took up
the proposed rules, and threatened to sink the entire enterprise of codifying federal evidence law.”).
222. See Kelleher, supra note 99, at 55.

Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2019

37

Akron Law Review, Vol. 52 [2019], Iss. 2, Art. 6

360

AKRON LAW REVIEW

[52:323

P.A. v. Allstate Insurance Co. 223 the Court considered the interplay
between Federal Rule 23, which sets out the criteria for class actions, and
a New York state law that forbade class action treatment of actions based
on a statutory penalty. 224 There was a cogent argument, cogent enough to
convince four Justices in dissent, that this state law was based on a “a
manifestly substantive end” of “[l]imiting a defendant’s liability in a
single lawsuit in order to prevent the exorbitant inflation of
penalties. . . .” 225 But other state laws might have standards for class
certification varying from Rule 23 only for procedural reasons. As Justice
Scalia recognized, Justice Ginsburg’s position would result in the Rule
being “valid in some jurisdictions and invalid in others . . . depending
upon whether its effect is to frustrate a state substantive.” 226
How can the rulemakers consider whether a federal rule should
displace state law when state law is varied? Whether to displace is a statelaw-by-state-law question. 227 One cannot decide that all of (or none of)
the state laws that parallel a federal rule are displaced. 228 The Advisory
Committee needs before it, it would appear, a particular state law in order
to assess the federal rule. But I believe such concerns are surmountable.
In considering Rule 23 on class actions, for example, the rulemakers could
certainly imagine state laws like the one in Shady Grove that are
substantive in that they intend to reduce litigation and create a more
favorable business environment. Armed with that imagination, they might
address preemption of state laws that fall within that class. Or consider a
federal rule amendment recently adopted and transmitted to Congress that
prohibits payment “in connection with . . . forgoing or withdrawing an
objection” to a proposed class action settlement absent court approval. 229
Since the proposed Rule would seem to make void a contractual
agreement, it does not take great imagination to see that this provision
could perhaps impact some substantive state interests. To be clear, I doubt
that a state would have a substantive policy protecting payments for

223. 559 U.S. 393 (2010).
224. See id. at 396.
225. See id. at 445 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
226. See id. at 409.
227. See Rensberger, supra note 15, at 1637 (arguing the Erie question requires a state-by-state
approach).
228. See Roosevelt III, supra note 3, at 38 (“Hanna’s invocation of the Advisory Committee,
Congress, and the Court begs the question. None of those entities is in a position to decide whether
applying the rule in a particular case will modify a substantive right, for the obvious reason that they
have no way to foresee that case.”).
229. See 324 F.R.D. 904, 908 (April 26, 2018) (proposed amendment to Rule 23(e)(5)(B)).
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withdrawing objections, but given the nature of the federal rule, one can
see the need to think about it. Or consider the current version of Rule 15(c)
on relation back. It provides a federal test for relation back and also
provides that relation back is additionally allowed if it is permitted by “the
law that provides the applicable statute of limitations.”230 But what if state
law in a diversity forbids relation back while the federal standard would
allow it. This is an obvious and foreseeable Erie issue. 231 Why not address
the rulemakers’ intent about displacing state law in the Rule or its
commentary?
Contrast the foregoing with the currently proposed amendments to
Rule 5, which address electronic service of process by using a court’s
electronic-filing system. 232 It can scarce be imagined that this rule would
not displace state law. State substantive interests would not be implicated
by this rule, nor would it induce forum-shopping. Moreover, in non-Erie
(i.e. substantive) preemption cases, it is not unusual for Congress to write
a preemption clause that preempts only some state laws, depending upon
their content. 233 Thus, rulemakers in other contexts have shown an ability
to make tailored, state-by-state preemption expressions.
Finally, it must be admitted, my proposal to use the Rules Enabling
Act’s prohibition of affecting substantive rights as a check on state law
displacement is ahistorical. It has been persuasively demonstrated that this
prohibition was meant to restrict the Supreme Court as a rulemaker as
against Congress, not the states. 234 But the current scheme under Sibbach
230. See FED. R. CIV. P. 15(c).
231. There is, in fact, a caselaw split on this issue. See Wright & Miller, et al., 6A FED. PRAC.
& PROC. CIV. § 1503 (3d ed.) (“When the federal rule is more liberal than the state rule, the clear
weight of authority is that Rule 15(c) governs, although there are some cases to the contrary.”).
232. See 324 F.R.D. 904 (proposed Rule 5(b)(2)(E)).
233. See Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 500 (1996) (“[Federal preemption provisions]
require a careful comparison between the allegedly pre-empting federal requirement and the allegedly
pre-empted state requirement to determine whether they fall within the intended pre-emptive scope
of the statute and regulations.”).
234. For the major work on this point see Stephen B. Burbank, The Rules Enabling Act of 1934,
130 U. PA. L. REV. 1015 (1982) (“[T]he procedure/substance dichotomy in the [Rules Enabling Act]
was intended to allocate lawmaking power between the Supreme Court as rulemaker and Congress”)
Id. at 1106. (“[T]he preservation of state law, as such, was not a primary concern when the [Enabling]
Act was formulated. . . .”) Id. at 1109; see also Redish & Murashko, supra note 196, at 56 (explaining
that the extensive research of Professor Burbank convincingly revealed that the Enabling Act’s
restrictions were an attempt to allocate power between Congress and the Supreme Court); Kelleher,
supra note 99, at 92 (explaining the “myth” that “in limiting the Court’s rulemaking authority in the
Rules Enabling Act, Congress was primarily concerned with preventing the inappropriate
displacement of state substantive law by a Federal Rule was exploded by Professor Burbank.”);
Carrington, supra note 99, at 283 (“The concern expressed in Congress was that an expansive reading
might be given to the statutory term ‘procedure’ to enable a court rule to override political decisions
made by Congress.”).
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and Hanna is equally to be faulted as atextual, ignoring the substantive
limitation in the Enabling Act. 235 The suggested approach has, if nothing
else, the virtue of making our garbled law easier to apply. It fails to rebuild
the tangled roadway of Erie, but it offers the hope of marking the lanes a
little more clearly.
D.

What Entity Should Make Preemption Statements?

Thus far, I have not addressed the issue of who would make
preemption statements. If one concludes that the Erie apparatus (on the
Hanna side) would run better if statements about displacement of state
law were made at the point of promulgation, the next question is what
entity should make such a statement, the Supreme Court as the transmitter
of the rules to Congress or the Judicial Conference’s rulemaking apparatus
(the Advisory Committee or the Standing Committee). For a variety of
reasons, I believe that the Supreme Court should not be announcer of state
law displacement. Rather, the Advisory Committee, if anyone, should.
First, as noted above, there is no tradition of comment on the rules
by the Supreme Court. 236 The absence of a prior practice by the Court does
not make impossible the creation of a future one, but it is suggestive. The
best indicator of the future is often the past. Why the court has not
commented cannot be known. But one can imagine several plausible
reasons. Collectively these arguments from past practice counsel against
a change.
First, the court may feel limited in its competence. Justice White
spoke to this issue in 1993. Based on the observation that the Court
“hardly ever refused to transmit the rules submitted by the Judicial
Conference and . . . that . . . it has been quite rare for any Justice to
dissent,” he concluded that “a sizable majority of the 21 Justices who sat
during this period concluded that Congress intended them to have a rather
limited role in the rulemaking process.” 237 He agreed with prior
statements of Justice Douglas that given the expertise of the Judicial
Conference and Advisory Committees, Congress should bypass the Court
altogether and simply receive proposed rules from the Conference.238
Even though Congress did not do so, Justice White concluded that
Congress did not intend for the Court to “provide another layer of review

235.
236.
237.
238.

See supra notes 189–93 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 109–113 and accompanying text.
See 146 F.R.D. 401, 502–503.
See id. at 503.
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equivalent to that of the . . . Judicial Conference.” 239 He based this view
on the impracticalities of such an in-depth review—the inordinate amount
of time it would demand of the Court—and the fact that the judges and
lawyers who comprise the Judicial Conference and Advisory Committees
“are in a far better position to make a practical judgment upon [the
proposed rules’] utility or inutility than we.” 240 Thus, “the Court’s role . . .
is to transmit the Judicial Conference’s recommendations without change
and without careful study, as long as there is no suggestion that the
committee system has not operated with integrity.” 241
This concern of consuming the scarce time of the Court has some,
albeit limited, validity in this context. The competence concern is less
compelling. Taking the latter first, the proposed role of the Court here is
not to pass upon the merits of a rule—its utility or inutility—but as to how
it operates as against state law. This Erie question is not one upon which
lower court judges or practicing lawyers have any special expertise.
Whether a federal rule should preempt state law is not a question that one
becomes more capable of answering by trying cases. Thus, the only real
impediment here is time, and that is not to be discounted. Although the
productivity of the Court as measured by signed opinions has fallen
greatly over the last several decades,242 the number of pages per opinion
has increased. The median word count in opinions has increased “from
2000 words in the late 1950s, to over 8200 by 2009.” 243 Likewise, the
number of certiorari petitions has increased. 244 Nonetheless, the days are
long gone when the Chief Justice was speaking publicly of a caseload

239. See id. at 504.
240. See id.
241. See id. at 505.
242. See Eric J. Segall, Eight Justices Are Enough: A Proposal to Improve the United States
Supreme Court, 45 PEPP. L. REV. 547, 567 (2018) (“[The] Supreme Court only hears about seventyfive cases a year, which is less than one percent of all cases in state and federal courts.”); Glenn Harlan
Reynolds, Looking Ahead: October Term 2016, CATO SUP. CT. REV. 313, 326 (2015-2016); Kenneth
W. Starr, The Supreme Court and Its Shrinking Docket: The Ghost of William Howard Taft, 90 MINN.
L. REV. 1363, 1368 (2006) (providing numbers showing that “the number of cases coming before the
Supreme Court grew steadily since 1925, while the number of cases the Court decides has been in
steady decline.”).
243. See Michael Gentithes, Check the Invitation: The Trouble with Appeals Invited by Supreme
Court Justices, 82 MO. L. REV. 339, 353 (2017).
244. See The Supreme Court, The Supreme Court at Work, SUPREMECOURT.GOV
https://www.supremecourt.gov/about/courtatwork.aspx [https://perma.cc/HUN5-SFAZ]:
Each Term, approximately 7,000-8,000 new cases are filed in the Supreme Court. This is
a substantially larger volume of cases than was presented to the Court in the last century.
In the 1950 Term, for example, the Court received only 1,195 new cases, and even as
recently as the 1975 Term it received only 3,940.
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crisis 245 or the Federal Judicial Center’s Study Group on the Supreme
Court’s caseload opined that the Court’s volume of work prevented “the
conditions essential for the performance of the Court’s mission . . . [and]
the appropriate fulfillment of [the court’s] historic and essential
functions.” 246 But even in this new age of a Court with fewer opinions the
proposal would add a significant new burden to the Court, not unlike
adding several Erie cases to its docket with each set of amendments to the
federal rules.
Of even greater concern to me is the relatively poor institutional
infrastructure of the Court to render informed decisions in a rulemaking
context. The question of whether a federal rule should displace state law
would come before the Court with no briefing, no appellate argument, and
no adversarial presentation. Those are the informational inputs the Court
customarily relies upon. It does not have mechanisms in place to take
testimony, commission studies, or consult experts. It is not a legislature
by constitutional role and consequently has not built up the framework to
operate as one. The Judicial Conference, the Standing Committee on
Rules, and the Advisory Committees are much broader institutions,
having more participants from more backgrounds. The Civil Rules
Advisory Committee, for example, in 2017, had 17 members made up of
seven district court judges, one circuit court judge, a justice of a state
supreme court, three law professors, four practitioners, and a
representative from the Justice Department. 247 The Standing Committee
has 19 members and has as similarly diverse membership. 248
Finally, the Supreme Court operates as a reviewing court. Having it
articulate the preemptive effect of federal rules upon state law would give
it both the first and the last word on the matter. If preemption statements
were made by the Judicial Conference or the Advisory Committee, in
contrast, the Supreme Court would be available for later review and
correction. It could reject the preemption analysis of those bodies by
refusing to transmit a rule. Or, as suggested above, it could in litigation—
where it has all the informational inputs it is accustomed to operate with—
find a rule invalid as intruding upon substantive rights. Thus, it would be
245. See David M. O’Brien, Join-3 Votes, the Rule of Four, the Cert. Pool, and the Supreme
Court’s Shrinking Plenary Docket, 13 J.L. & POL. 779, 782 (1997).
246. See Federal Judicial Center, Report of the Study Group on the Caseload of the Supreme
Court, 57 F.R.D. 573, 581 (1972).
247. See Committees on Rules of Practice and Procedure Chairs and Reporters,
(Oct.
1,
2016),
http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/
USCOURTS.GOV
2016_committee_roster_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/S3MG-G639].
248. See id.
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more sensible, were this proposal to be adopted at all, for the Advisory
Committee to make the preemption statement. As noted above, they have
the institutional structure capable of making such a judgment. They can
study and debate an issue in the abstract. Indeed, that is exactly what they
do in drafting the rules.
On the other hand, there is once again the counsel of history. As
shown above, 249 the Advisory Committee has generally refrained from
opining on the displacement of state law by a federal rule. In the clearest
example of addressing the issue, the Advisory Committee backed away
from making a pronouncement, stating that the matter would be better
decided in a judicial decision in a litigated case. 250 At first blush, this
restraint makes little sense. Under the Hanna orthodoxy, once the low
hurdle of validity is cleared, the only further barrier to a federal rule
displacing state law is intent. Was the rule intended to reach the issue? 251
State law applies if there is no indication that the rule was intended to
apply. 252 If it were truly a matter of intent, then we could and should have
guidance on intent from the Advisory Committee. The Advisory
Committee, by declining to shoulder this responsibly over the years,
suggests perhaps that they know the mechanistic Hanna formula (intent +
validity = federal law applies) is an oversimplification. Moreover, the
expressed preference in the comments to the 1946 amendments to Rule
23 for the Erie question of state law displacement to be made in litigation,
not ex parte, reveals an attitude about the judicial role (or roles).
Whether the Advisory Committee opines on the Erie question or the
federal courts and the Supreme Court do so later in litigation, the decision
on Erie will have been made by a federal judge. 253 The only difference is
whether the judges are speaking as judges in litigation or as rulemakers
(in an administrative capacity). There are good reasons for thinking that
this Erie question as to validity should be left to litigation. 254 But none of
this explains why the rulemakers cannot remove a potential Erie problem
by disavowing a preemptive intent. And it does not explain why the
rulemakers cannot as a matter of policy choose to attempt to override state
249. FED. R. CIV. P. 23 (advisory committee’s note to 1946 amendment).
250. Id.
251. See Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22, 27 (1988).
252. See Walker v. Armco Steel Corp., 446 U.S. 740, 750 (1980).
253. While federal judges compose the vast majority of the persons involved in making the
federal rules, others—law professors and lawyers—are also involved. See supra note 247.
254. I have argued elsewhere that because parties receive greater protections in litigation than
in agency rulemaking, the courts should not defer to Advisory Committee’s decisions on the validity
of a federal rule. See Jeffrey L. Rensberger, Of Hats and Robes: Judicial Review of Nonadjudicative
Article III Functions, 53 U. RICH. L. REV. 623 (2019)
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law in the pursuit of federal interests, an assessment of rule efficiency or
fairness, or other federal policies.
V. CONCLUSION
The current structure of our analysis of the Erie issue in the context
of a federal rule delays consideration of the displacement of state law until
litigation, long after the rule has been drafted and adopted. But we need
not have such a system. The Advisory Committee could, similarly to
administrative agencies, state in commentary or in the text of a rule
whether the rule is intended to displace parallel or conflicting state law in
diversity cases. Entire Erie issues can be avoided by the rulemakers’
forswearing an intent to displace state law. When, on the other hand, the
rulemakers desire to displace state law, the federal courts in litigation, and
in particular the Supreme Court, can act as a check on undue imposition
upon the states by providing a meaningful enforcement of the limitations
of the Rules Enabling Act. That is, if the Supreme Court believes that a
rule unduly infringes on state substantive policies, it should declare the
rule invalid rather than (as it currently does) declare the rule valid but
inapplicable as not intended to apply. Such an approach would make this
wing of the Erie doctrine much more comprehensible and predictable.
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